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This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability,
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1 Introduction
Elections are widely recognized as an e↵ective instrument to promote political account-
ability, and to communicate voters’ preferences to politicians seeking or holding public
o ces; the literature in this area includes Besley and Smart (2007), Faguet (2004), Hin-
driks and Lockwood (2009).
This positive e↵ect of elections on accountability is thought to be more e↵ective if elec-
toral competition is stronger. A growing literature both in economics and political science
recognizes that political competition improves governments’ e ciency and economic out-
comes. See, for example: Stigler (1972), and Wittman (1989, 1995) on the e↵ect of
political competition on governments’ e ciency; Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010) on
political competition and economic growth; Galasso and Nannicini (2009), Gagliarducci,
Nannicini, and Naticchioni, (2008), and Merlo et al. (2008) on political competition and
candidate performance. The common denominator of all these studies is that when can-
didates face strong political competition, voters are better able to hold them accountable;
this, in turn, reduces rent diversion and induces candidates to exert more e↵ort.
In this paper we suggest an alternative story: stronger electoral competition does not
necessarily imply better political accountability. When electoral competition is stronger,
politicians also have stronger incentives to weaken accountability channels. We concen-
trate our analysis on one aspect of public policy that is commonplace in most countries:
governments’ ability to finance public expenditures via multiple tax instruments. This
feature plays an important role in shaping local public finance because it leaves to the
discretion of politicians not only the level of taxation, but also the tax mix across the
available instruments. Our work examines the di↵erent degree of salience of the available
revenue sources for municipalities.
The public finance literature has extensively explored government decision making in
determining the mix of taxes that will be used. Hettich and Winer (1984, 1988), for
example, claim that a vote-maximizing government sets taxes such that in equilibrium
the marginal political cost of each tax instrument is equalized. This is confirmed by
a number of empirical papers (among others Ashworth et al., 2005, who look at the
issue of tax innovation). Our analysis contributes to this literature, providing an in-
depth explanation of the origins of these political costs, and their relationships with
electoral competition and political accountability. In particular, we claim that political
costs are better understood under the concept of tax salience. Chetty, Looney, and Kroft
(2009) show how voters are likely to underestimate their aggregate tax burdens from tax
instruments (such as sale taxes or indirect taxes in general) that are paid in small amounts
over time, compared to tax instruments for which taxpayers make lump-sum payments of
their aggregate tax liabilities on an annual basis (such as property or income taxes).
Our conjecture is that stronger electoral competition pushes incumbent policymakers
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to substitute more salient taxes with the less salient ones with detrimental e↵ects on the
transparency of fiscal policy and electoral accountability. To address this issue, we develop
a simple political agency model based on Dixit and Londregan (1998) and Bracco et al.
(2015). The model verifies and refines our intuitions regarding the loss of tax salience
in politically competitive environments.We model the behavior of an incumbent local
policymaker (a mayor), who is responsible for providing a local public good, and has the
power to make decisions regarding its funding. Two di↵erent policy instruments to collect
fiscal revenue are available, each di↵ering in their degree of salience. When elections take
place, voters base their decisions both on economic grounds and on ideology.
We then bring our theoretical predictions to the data, building a large dataset on
Italian local elections and taxes for the period from 1999 to 2008. Italian municipalities
derive their main tax revenues from a property tax (denoted ICI),1 but they also heavily
rely on many other sources of revenues, such as waste-management taxes, personal income
surtaxes, and a vast array of fees and charges.
A small but important literature has singled out property taxes as a highly salient tax
(see, for example, Cabral and Hoxby, 2010). Taxpayers often perceive this tax as an unfair
burden on a necessity (the home in which they live). In Italy, the focus of our empirical
analysis, the municipal real-estate tax is often at the forefront of the debate in mayoral
and general elections, while other taxes and smaller charges and fees play a much more
peripheral role in manifestos. At the same time, however, policy debate in Italy has also
highlighted the excessive number of taxes and fees, and the ine ciency stemming from
this.2
Taxes, such as the municipal property tax, are paid in one or two lump sums; by
contrast, other government charges and fees are collected at the point of service in small
increments throughout the fiscal year. Voters perceive the role the mayor plays in setting
“visible” taxes, but they often lack understanding of how much leverage and freedom a
mayor has in setting government fees and charges. Variations in these fees are often driven
by revenue concerns, rather than by variations in the costs of provision of services.3 Taxing
properties is widely recognized as one of the most e cient and least distorting ways for
governments to raise money. Because of the immobility of the tax base, property taxes
constitute a stable source of revenue, less prone to cyclical swings, easy to calculate and
hard to avoid; property taxes are particularly suitable for local governments (see, for
1ICI is the Italian acronym for “Imposta Comunali sugli Immobili” (Municipal property tax).
2There is an ongoing proposal to reform the Italian local tax system, and to replace the current taxes
and fees with a single Service Tax; though the issue has been debated for years, and the Italian parliament
has agreed to its introduction in principle, implementation has yet to occur.
3As an example, one may cite the increase in burial fees of up to 100 percent in Turin in 2008. See
“Morire a Torino? Troppo caro” (“Dying in Turin? Too expensive”) published on September 6th, 2008,
in the newspaper, La Stampa.
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example, Norregaard, 2013, and Oates, 1999, 2001). A recent study by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD,2010) has established that property
taxes are the least distortive tax instrument in terms of reducing long-run GDP per capita.
In our empirical analysis, we first focus on determining which sources of revenues are
and are not salient. We then estimate an equation examining the interaction between
mayors’ popularity and the types of revenue sources he or she uses. We find that the
probability of a mayor’s re-election depends (negatively) on the extent of the property
tax, but not on the other sources of revenue, such as fees and charges. We take this as
a test for the degree of salience of the various fiscal instruments available to Italian local
policymakers.
We then proceed to test the theoretical model’s prediction. We find that a 1 percent
decrease in the margin of victory (i.e., the di↵erence in the vote share) between the elected
mayor and her challenger generates a 0.53 euro drop in the per-capita tax revenue from
ICI (the main property tax in Italy) and a simultaneous increase in revenues from fees
for “local services” by 0.66 euro per-capita. We find that, consistent with our hypothesis,
electoral cycles also play an important role in shaping tax- and fee-setting decisions.
Moreover, we find that substitution between fees and taxes occurs mainly in the years
close to elections. In short, the e↵ect is stronger when elections are coming up, and when
candidates face more political competition.
In order to rule out possible alternative explanations, we carry out a number of robust-
ness checks. First, we employ Regression Discontinuity Design to check whether partisan
allegiance a↵ects fiscal decisions, such as, for example, right-wing mayors preferring to
fund services through specific charges, and left-wing mayors preferring to rely on general
taxation. We find that the link between political competition and tax-mix choices is un-
a↵ected by the mayor’s ideology thus ruling out that party preferences are the drivers of
our results. Second, to address the endogeneity of the municipal margin of victory, we
proxy mayoral-election political competition by regional-election electoral outcomes at the
municipal level. We do this both through a reduced form model and by instrumenting
for mayoral electoral outcomes with regional (municipality-level) ones. In both cases we
obtain analogous results.
The concept of tax salience is closely related to the concept of fiscal illusion stem-
ming from complex tax systems (see the seminal works by Puviani (1903) and Buchanan
(1967)4).5In economics, this issue has been the object of a handful of studies: Krishna
and Slemrod (2003) — drawing mainly from the psychology and marketing literatures —
review how governments exploit various behavioral biases in the electorate to decrease
4“... to the extent that the total tax load on an individual can be fragmented so that he confronts
numerous small levies rather than a few significant ones, illusionary e↵ects may be created.” James
Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice 135 (1967).
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the perceived tax burden.5 McCa↵ery and Baron (2006) use laboratory simulations of
tax setting to show that test subjects are willing to tolerate higher overall tax levels when
the tax is imposed through many smaller taxes, rather than through a single large tax,
because of the inability to correctly remember the overall tax burden.
Along these lines Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) use variation across U.S. states
and over time to analyze the behavioral response of alcohol consumption to variations
in excise (included in price) and sales taxes (added to price); they find that consumers
respond more to the more salient (excise) and less to less salient (sales) taxes. They also
describe a theoretical model, mostly aimed at assessing how the di↵erence in salience
a↵ects the tax burden between sellers and buyers; however, they do not explore the
potential electoral consequences of this. They then focus on the technical di culties in
reconciling the boundedly rational behavior of consumers — who are only partially able
to calculate their tax bills — within a fully rational economic model in which consumers’
budget constraints are not violated.
Finkelstein (2009) shows that the introduction of electronic toll collections on U.S.
roads, tunnels, and bridges has two e↵ects: (i) it makes citizens less likely to know the
amount of toll they pay, and (ii) it is associated with an increase in tolls; i.e., electronic
collection increases the equilibrium toll rate by decreasing its salience. The theoretical
model distinguishes between tax salience at the time of consumption (which leads agents
to overconsume goods as a result of underestimating their non-salient sale tax) and tax
salience at the time of voting (which leads agents to hold to account government relatively
more for more salient tax policies). Similarly, our model assumes that some fiscal instru-
ments are (politically) more salient than others. Unlike Finkelstein (2009), however, we
present a fully micro-founded model of the government’s tax-setting behavior stemming
from the salience di↵erentials.
This is not the first attempt in the literature to analyze the interaction between the
tax mix and electoral outcomes, or the e↵ect of government financing on political account-
ability. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to relate the tax
mix to the degree of political competition, and to thoroughly explore the transmission
mechanism between the two. In addition to the works already cited, Milesi-Ferretti (2003)
studies the e↵ect of fiscal rules on economic outcomes; Alt and Dreyer Lassen (2003) look
at the government’s choice between taxes or debt; Coate and Morris (1995) investigates
the hidden financing of interest groups; Bordignon and Minelli, (2001) consider the trade-
o↵ between accountability and e ciency; Bordignon et al. (2017) look at similar data to
ours and compare the e↵ect of the property tax to a newly established municipal income
tax, and find that mayors seeking re-election (i.e., those who are not subject to a term
5McCa↵ery and Baron dubbed this phenomenon the “disaggregation bias;” subjects appeared unable
to hold together in their minds the cumulative e↵ects of several small taxes.
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limit) favored the new tax; the authors argue that this new tax was less transparent.
Finally, our results can also be linked with the extensive literature on political budget
cycle (for a review, see Dubois, 2016), which confirms that many public finance items are
subject to pre-electoral political manipulation, and, therefore, shows a cyclical pattern
across the electoral term.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section introduces the economic environ-
ment and the model. Section 3 provides some background information on Italian local
electoral and tax systems, as well as data description. Section 4 presents our empirical
strategy and main results.Section 5 provides robustness checks. Section 6 o↵ers conclu-
sions and discussion.
2 The Theoretical Framework
We develop a simple two-period model of political competition based on Dixit and Lon-
dregan (1998), Alesina and Tabellini (2007) and Bracco et al. (2015). The model focuses
on the link between the choice among fiscal instruments and political competition.
2.1 The Economic Environment
We focus on a representative local jurisdictions, also referred to as a municipality, ruled
by elected mayor. In each of periods t = 1, 2, the incumbent mayor decides on the
fiscal revenue mix and provides a local public good, Gt. Mayors raise revenues from two
separate sources {⌧1t, ⌧2t}, which di↵er in their degree of salience (more on this later).
Fiscal resources, ⌧1, ⌧2, and output, G, are described by the following relationship:
Gt = ⌧1t + ⌧2t + at (1)
where at represents the ability of the mayor in o ce at time t. The ability is the realization
of a random variable with known distribution. This realization is unknown to voters, but
known to the individual mayor, and it is invariant over time, i.e. in case of re-election the
mayor will retain her ability into Period Two. If instead the incumbent mayor loses the
election, the relevant Period-Two ability is going to be that of the challenger; this is once
again drawn from the same distribution.
Assuming public good provision as in Eq. (1) has two main implications: first, such
public good provision depends simultaneously on the mayor’s strategic choice of each of
the two tax instruments {⌧1t, ⌧2t} and on her exogenous ability at; second, it implicitly
imposes a balanced budget condition, i.e. a public good provision in year t is funded by
tax revenues collected in year t only. This latter feature is quite innocuous with respect
6
to our empirical analysis: Italian municipalities are heavily restricted in their ability to
employ debt instruments, especially for financing current expenditures.
The order of events is as follows: In Period One, nature draws the ability of the
incumbent mayor aM , the incumbent mayor chooses the Period One tax policy (⌧11, ⌧21);
and, finally, G1 is determined via Eq. (1). At the end of Period One, voters try to infer
the incumbent’s ability, and they vote in municipal elections for the incumbent or the
challenger. The winner takes o ce in Period Two, and chooses (⌧12, ⌧22), which, together
with her ability, determines G2.
The specific feature of our model — and of the handful of other papers that modeled
tax salience — is in the need to depart from full rationality. Following Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft (2009) and Finkelstein (2009), we assume that voters face a so-called “cognitive
bias” in that they are relatively unaware of the less-salient tax instrument ⌧2, while are
perfectly aware of the (more salient) tax ⌧1. In other words, voters believe that the cost
of calculating the actual amount of one tax instrument (⌧2) is larger than the potential
utility gain from doing so.
The introduction of this element of bounded rationality needs to be reconciled with the
(mostly) rational behavior of individual agents. As consumers, players are paying taxes,
which negatively a↵ect private consumption; as voters, they are not able to hold mayors
into account for the full amount of one of the two taxes being levied. Accordingly, a
justification can be mande by thinking that agents make day-to-day consumption choices
consistently with the budget constraint, while, instead, agents make periodical voting
decisions subject to the above-mentioned cognitive bias. An alternative and analogous
interpretation is that voters only partially attribute expenditure on one tax instrument
to the political responsibility of the mayor, and thus do not discount it as the product of
a discretionary political decision.
Our assumption is that when voters decide whether to re-elect the incumbent, only a
fraction s of tax ⌧2 paid is attributed to the mayor’s performance, while the awareness of
the private and public good consumption is full. The implication is that, because of this
cognitive limitation, voters infer the ability of mayors in a systematically imprecise way.
2.2 Payo↵s
In each municipality there is a continuum of voters of mass 1 with period-specific utility
U i(Gt, ct) = c
i
t + v(Gt) (2)
cit = m
j   ⌧1t   ⌧2t   d(⌧1t)   (⌧2t) (3)
where i is the index denoting each single voter, cit is the consumption of the numeraire
good, v(·) is the monotonically increasing and concave preference for public goods, and
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mi is the private income of voter i. Finally, following a frequent modeling choice in
the public finance literature (see, e.g. Bolton and Roland, 1997) we also introduce d(·)
and  (·), which are two separate monotonic and convex functions that acknowledge the
distortions created by each tax on top of the loss of income, such as deadweight loss and
compliance cost. Our results would hold also in absence of these two deadweight functions;
we chose to state these explicitly in order to highlight that our results are independent of
the absolute or relative — administrative or economic — e ciency of each tax instrument.
The shape of these functions contributes to determining the equilibrium tax mix, but it
does not a↵ect the comparative statics dynamics as reported in the Testable Predictions
that conclude this theoretical section.
Substituting the budget constraint in Eq. (2), and ignoring mi, we get a voter payo↵
over government policies of v(Gt)   ⌧1t   ⌧2t   d(⌧1t)    (⌧2t). Moreover, following Dixit
and Londregan (1998), we assume voter i has an ideological preference for the incumbent,
measured negatively by X i. So voter i’s overall payo↵ is
v(Gt)  ⌧1t   ⌧2t   d(⌧1t)   (⌧2t) X i (4)
We assumeX i is distributed independently across voters and uniformly in [⌘ˆ 1/2⇣, ⌘ˆ+
1/2⇣], with ⇣ inversely measuring the dispersion of ideological preferences in the represen-
tative municipality and where ⌘ is a random popularity shock, uncorrelated with voters’
ideology and mayor’s choices, hitting the municipality before election and uniformly dis-
tributed on the support [ 1/2 , 1/2 ].
Mayors are quasi-benevolent, i.e. they care about the utility of their citizens, either
because they are (at least partially) public spirited or because they are citizens themselves;
they also receive, however, an “ego rent” ⇢ when they are in o ce. We assume that ⇢ is
large enough so that any incumbent mayor always prefers to be re-elected, independently
of her ability.6
Let us spell out the intertemporal utility function UM of the mayor in power at t = 1;
for the sake of simplicity we assume that the intertemporal discount factor is unity:
UM = ⇢+ cM1 + v(G1) + p (⇢+ U
M
2 (a
M)) + (1  p) Ea[U2(a)]] (5)
where p is the probability of incumbent re-election, UM2 (a
M) is the utility net of the
ego rent ⇢ in case of re-election (which depends on the incumbent mayor’s ability), and
Ea[U2(a)] is the utility in case of electoral defeat, which is an expectation over the ability
distribution of the challenger.
6In other words: ⇢ > Ea[v(⌧12+ ⌧22+a)]  v(⌧12+ ⌧22+aM ), where aM is the period-one incumbent’s
ability, and the expectation operator signifies the expected public good provision in Period Two of a
mayor with random ability.
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2.3 Theoretical Results
We solve the model backwards. In Period Two the incumbent mayor maximizes her
utility. In absence of re-election incentives, a mayor’s utility is the analogous to the one
of a citizen (see Eq. 2). The Period-Two first-order conditions of the sitting mayor M
are:
@UM2
@⌧12
= v0(⌧12 + ⌧22 + aM)  1  d0(⌧12) = 0 (6)
@UM2
@⌧22
= v0(⌧12 + ⌧22 + aM)  1   0(⌧22) = 0 (7)
from which we can derive the mayor’s equilibrium Period Two tax strategy {⌧ ⇤21(aM), ⌧ ⇤22(aM)}.
The mayor’s decision on fiscal matters in Period Two depends crucially on her ability, and
by the Envelope Theorem we can state that voters’ utility in Period Two is increasing in
the mayor’s ability, i.e.:
dUM2
 
⌧ ⇤21(a
M), ⌧ ⇤22(a
M)
 
daM
=
@UM2
@aM
= v0a(G2) > 0 (8)
As a direct implication, voters’ Period-One problem can be reduced to inferring the
mayor’s ability from her Period One tax policy.
In Period One, voters are fully aware of public good provision (G1), but discount one
of the two tax instrument ⌧21 only partially. Given taxes — whether fully (⌧11) or partially
(⌧21) perceived — voters incorrectly infer the total revenues, and “discount” that from
the observed public good. The di↵erence between these two is the inferred ability of the
incumbent mayor. As Gt = ⌧1t + ⌧2t + a,
ae = G1   ⌧11   s⌧21 = aM + (1  s)⌧21 (9)
where G1 is the amount of public good consumed in Period One, ae is the inferred ability,
aM is the actual ability of the incumbent, and s 2 (0, 1) is the salience of the second
tax instrument ⌧2. We can see how voters’ cognitive bias leads them to systematically
overestimate the ability of the mayor; the e↵ect is more pronounced the higher is ⌧21. The
other tax instrument ⌧11 is, instead, fully discounted, and has a neutral impact on the
inference problem. We can summarize these findings in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The e↵ect of a change in the fiscal choices on the expected ability is
@ae
@⌧11
= 0,
@ae
@⌧21
= 1  s (10)
In other words, voters fully discount one kind of tax, and partially discount the other,
introducing a further “favor” of mayors for the less salient revenue source.
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As voters’ utility in Period Two only depends on the ability of the mayor, we can ex-
pect this to play out as a simple threshold-based rule. Voter i’s electoral behavior can be
written as: vote for the incumbent if U2(ae) Xi > Ea[U2(a)], vote for the challenger oth-
erwise. In other words, voters will compare the utility they expect to get from re-electing
the incumbent U2(ae), whose ability ae has been imperfectly inferred, and the utility of
electing the challenger Ea[U2(a)], whose ability is unknown (with known distribution).7
We can therefore state the popularity equation in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. The incumbent expects to receive the following vote share:
V =
1
2
+ ⇣[U2(a
e)  Ea[U2(a)]  ⌘ˆ] (11)
and her probability of winning is:
p =
1
2
+  [U2(a
e)  Ea[U2(a)]] (12)
Proof in Appendix.
As we can see, the probability of winning crucially depends on the incumbent mayor’s
ability as inferred by voters ae. As shown in Lemma 1, the inferred ability depends only
on the non-salient tax because public good provision funded by the salient tax is fully
discounted by voters. In other words: the incumbent mayor needs to use the non-salient
tax ⌧21 to influence voting behaviour. From this, together with Eq. (5) one can calculate
the incumbent’s Period One first-order conditions.
@UM1
@⌧11
: (v0G1   1  d0⌧11) = 0 (13)
@UM1
@⌧21
: (v0G1   1   0⌧21) +  (1  s) v0(ae)(UM2 (aM) + ⇢  Ea[U2(a)]) = 0 (14)
where by aM we mean the ability of Period-One mayor, and v0(ae) is the marginal utility
from consuming public goods for an amount that a mayor with ability ae would provide.
The first part of both first-order conditions is very similar between Eqs (13) and (14), and
represents the marginal utility of increasing each tax instrument (and therefore spending).
The extra term of Eq. (14) signifies the e↵ect on the probability of winning (and therefore
on the mayor’s Period-Two utility) and of increasing the amount of non-salient taxes ⌧21.
As already mentioned, the salient tax instrument ⌧11 instead has a neutral e↵ect on
elections as it is perfectly discounted by voters.
7More pedantically, one may write Ea[U2(a)] =
R
U2(a)f(a)da where f(a) is the probability distribu-
tion function of the ability.
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Assuming the equilibrium is an interior solution, we can interpret the parameter  
as a measure of the variability the mayor faces in the probability of winning. In other
words, higher  is related to a more uncertain electoral result. In this sense we can relate
the value of the parameter  with the electoral competitiveness of a municipality or,
analogously, the uncertainty of the electoral result.
Totally di↵erentiating the first-order conditions, one may state the following testable
predictions (proof in Appendix).
Testable Prediction 1. Salient taxes ⌧1 decrease as the competitiveness of the locality
 increases.
Testable Prediction 2. Non-salient taxes ⌧2 increase as the competitiveness of the lo-
cality  increases.
Testable Prediction 3. Holding everything constant, salient taxes are lower and non-
salient taxes are higher in election years than in non-election years (⌧11 < ⌧21, ⌧21 > ⌧22).
As we show in the Appendix, we proxy an election year with Period One and a non-
election year with Period Two. Note that in Period Two mayors care only about their
own utility, and they are not concerned about re-election; in this way, di↵erences in
Period-One and Period-Two behaviors can shed light on the behavior of mayors seeking
re-election as opposed to mayors facing a term-limit. This theoretical results can also be
linked with the extensive literature on political budget cycle (for a review, see Dubois,
2016); the result expands the literature’s findings by analysing the interaction between
revenue sources, rather than the variation of single items across the electoral cycle.
3 Background Information and Data
In this section we present some relevant background information on the Italian local
electoral system and public finance.
3.1 Institutional Framework
Italian municipalities (comuni) are ruled by a mayor (sindaco), who is directly elected
every five years,8 and is subject to a two-term limit. The electoral system varies according
to a population threshold: large municipalities (with more than 15,000 inhabitants) use a
runo↵ system, while small municipalities (with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants) use simple
8Before 2000, mayors were elected to four-year terms.
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plurality.9 Mayors are responsible for the provision of the following services: land man-
agement and environment (water, sewage, public hygiene), social services, local transport,
local police, culture and recreation, and education (mainly nursery schools and comple-
mentary services). The balance of power between mayor and council is strongly in favor
of the mayor: the electoral system always awards her a solid majority in the council, and
freely chooses the members of the executive committee (giunta); her resignation would
trigger new council and mayoral elections.
In our sample period, the political system was dominated by two large electoral cartels
that alternated in governments in every tier. At the national level, a right-wing coalition
ruled Italy from 2001 to 2006. The left-wing coalition ruled from 1996 to 2001, and then
again from 2006 until 2008. At least for the vast majority of large municipalities, local
elections involve the same coalitions supporting joint mayoral candidates, such that local
and national political debates appeared quite coherent with each other, while in small
municipalities local una liated candidates often prevail. From o cial data on mayors
published by the Interior Ministry we are able to see each mayor’s political allegiance
(i.e.,under which party-label he or she ran for election); Table A1 in the Appendix provides
a full list of the parties coded by political coalitions for municipalities that are included
in our regression sample.
3.2 Local government financing
During the period of our analysis, municipalities’ revenues come from two main sources:
transfers from upper tiers of government (mainly central and regional governments) and
municipalities’ own revenues.10 There are two types of own revenue recorded in Italian
municipalities’ Final Budget Accounts: (i) revenue from taxes, and (ii) revenue from fees.
9Small and large municipalities also di↵er in the electoral system for their city councils. These are
elected together with the mayor through an open-list proportional representation system, in which lists
are explicitly linked to mayoral candidates. In small municipalities, each mayor is supported by a single
city council list, and voters express a single vote for the mayor and the associated list. The mayoral
candidate who gets the plurality of votes is elected, and two-thirds of the council seats are awarded to her
associated list. In large municipalities, mayoral candidates can be supported by more than one list (i.e.,
by a coalition of lists), and voters cast two separate votes: one for the mayor, and one for the list; voters
are allowed to split their tickets. The lists associated to the winning mayor (who is elected through a
runo↵ system) are awarded 60 percent of seats in the council.
10The use of a debt instrument is strongly restricted by the so-called “Internal Stability and Growth
Pact,” through which the central government limits the ability of local authorities to incur debt, in order
to comply with the European Union’s constraints on deficit and debt. Moreover, the Italian Constitution
allows local governments to use debt financing only to cover capital expenditures. Because our analysis
focuses on current expenditures, we abstain from considering the debt as an active source of financing.
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The main source of tax revenue for Italian municipalities is a property tax, denoted
ICI, introduced in 1992, and applied to real estate. This tax, which accounts for about 33
percent of municipalities’ own revenues, is characterized by a high degree of transparency:
property owners have to pay it (in one or two installments) every year directly to the
municipality where the estate is located. The tax base is represented by the land registry
values.11 Mayors are free to set the tax rate within a given boundary (between 0.4 percent
and 0.7 percent of the “land-registry estimated income”); mayors also have the power to
lower the tax burden of resident homeowners through a discounted tax rate.
Another source of tax revenue in Italian municipalities is the waste-disposal tax
(TARSU/TIA), which is calculated (similarly to the ICI) on land registry values; munic-
ipalities enjoy total freedom in tax-rate setting for the waste-disposal tax. Finally,other
minor sources of tax revenues are the taxation of personal income — through the national
income-tax surtax — and electricity surcharge.
Both the property and the waste-disposal tax are paid once a year directly to the
council (or to the service provider). However, the waste-disposal tax occupies a less central
place than the property tax in the political debate. The waste-disposal tax also generates
fewer revenues. Bordignon et al. (2017) argue (but do not directly test the proposition)
that the latter group of “other” taxes is relatively less salient than the property tax:
personal income surtax and electricity surcharge are not paid directly to the municipality,
and are instead paid jointly with other items (personal income tax, electricity bill).
Additional own revenues are raised through means of a large array of fees: for parking
permits and certificates, for the use of public spaces and areas, for the use of public
billboards, etc. These fees account for around 38 percent of municipalities’ own revenue.
The common denominators of these fees are that each of them is comparatively small,
and that they are generally paid several times during the year.12 As a result, it is often
very di cult for voters to have a clear picture of the overall amount of such payments.
The main formal di↵erence between taxes and fees is that while both are a charge paid to
the government by individuals or by a business, a tax is levied as a part of the common
burden while a fee is specifically applied for the use of a service; unlike taxes, a fee ought
to be directly linked to the cost of providing the service. This is not usually the case,
however,for Italian municipalities, where there are virtually no statutory constraints on
the amount and source of revenue municipalities can raise through fees, or regulations
regarding how revenues are to be spent.
As described in Table A2 of the Appendix, only a small fraction of the local govern-
11The land registry (Nuovo Catasto Edilizio Urbano) was constituted between 1939 and 1956. So far
two revisions of property values have taken place in 1979 and 1990. The Italian Ministry of Finance is
responsible for the registry’s maintenance and updates.
12A full list of fees is provided in the Appendix (Table A3).
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ments’ costs is covered by revenues from fees. There is high variation between municipali-
ties in the use of fees, highlighted by standard deviations reported in the last column of the
table (see also MEF, 2014). This implies that fees are often seen as an additional source
of revenues to finance the general spending needs of the local government. Some fees, one
may argue, are also subject to very rigid demands (i.e., there is little to no choice about
whether to “purchase” services such as parking tickets, and compulsory school meals).
3.3 Data Description and Variables’ Definition
Our dataset includes municipal financial data, census data, and ballot data of municipal
elections from 1999 to 2008. Years before 1999 are excluded because of the lack of available
financial data; years after 2008 are excluded because after that time the structure of the
municipal property tax was subject to a deep reform process.13 Municipal elections are
not synchronized; the large number of municipalities implies that every year local elections
can be observed.
The empirical analysis is focused on large municipalities, i.e., those with a population
of more than 15,000 residents; these municipalities account for over 60 percent of the
Italian population. This choice has been motivated by the di↵erent structure of Italian
municipalities with populations below 15,000; these small municipalities are characterized
by a di↵erent electoral system.14 These small municipalities tend to manage most of the
provision of the services in association with other small municipalities, and this practice
reduces mayors’ autonomy in the decision-making process. We also exclude municipalities
in “Special-Autonomy” regions, which are potentially subject to di↵erent electoral and
public finance regulations.15 The exclusion of small municipalities, outliers and munic-
ipalities with missing values from our dataset leaves us with a sample of over 500 local
councils.
We start by describing our main variables of interest (the dependent variables of
the empirical model), which are measures of salient and non-salient fiscal instruments.
13In December 2007, the government approved the 2008 Budget Law, which ensured a reduction in the
property tax rate for a relatively large portion of homeowners. After some months, the (newly elected)
government repealed this tax for almost all homeowners. This implies that electors expected a tax rate
decrease to take place at least as of late 2007. This anticipated tax change may possibly have had some
impact on the elections held in 2008. However, restricting our analysis to the 1999-2007 sub-period
provide almost identical results; thus, we decided to keep 2008 data in the analysis.
14In Italy mayors are directly elected by a first-past-the-post system in small municipalities (below
15,000 inhabitants), and by a run-o↵ system in large municipalities (above 15,000 inhabitants).
15A full list of fees is provided in the Appendix (Table A3). Five out of the 20 regions in Italy have been
granted special autonomy: these are Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sicily, and
Sardinia. Less than 10 percent of Italians live in these regions.
14
In particular, tax sources of revenues are subdivided into three separate variables: the
property tax (ICI), the waste-disposal tax (TARSU/TIA), and the sum of municipal
income surtax and the electricity surcharge; the property tax is the largest item in terms
of revenues (see Table 1). We also consider the value of the “reduced” property tax rate,
applied only to residents, and the standard tax rate, applied to everybody else. Our
expectation is that these strictly defined, tax-derived sources of revenues are the most
salient levies; they mirror parameter ⌧1 of our theoretical model.
Other sources of revenues are fees and charges. We subdivide these into two variables:
(i) Fees for General Services, which include the long list of small fees reported in the Final
Budget Accounts under the item Revenues from local fees (burial fees, fines, etc.), and (ii)
Fees for other services, which include municipal advertising taxes, fees for the occupation
of public spaces and areas, and fees related to the issue of vital record certificates. Our
expectation is that these sources of revenues — fee, broadly speaking — are relatively
less salient; they mirror parameter ⌧2 of our theoretical model.
To make the above fiscal variables comparable across municipalities, we compute the
per-capita values of all monetary variables, and we also deflate them using the consump-
tion price index provided by the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), with 2010 as a
baseline year. A detailed list of municipal taxes and fees is provided in Table A3 in the
Appendix.
Finally, to analyze tax and fee setting simultaneously, we compute the tax ratio, TR,
as the share of per capita local taxes (property, waste-disposal and “other”) over total
fiscal revenue (⌧1/(⌧1 + ⌧2)), as reported in Table 1. This ratio ranges from 22 percent
to 92 percent. Table 1 also reports summary statistics for local taxes and fees, breaking
down the figures by type.
Insert table 1 in about here
Next, our key explanatory variable is a measure of political competition, PC, to
proxy for  in each municipality over time. We follow Galasso and Nannicini (2011) to
construct our measure for ex ante political contestability as the lagged margin of victory
in mayoral election results (l.MV.). This is calculated as the di↵erence between the vote
share obtained by the winner and the runner-up.16Values of l.MV. close to zero refer
to mayors who won by a very small margin, and therefore were subjected to intense
electoral competition; larger values correspond to mayors elected with a large margin and
who were therefore less subjected to competition. For the ease of exposition, we define
16If the mayor is elected in the first round (because he or she got more that 50 percent of votes),
firstround results are used; if a second round is held, second-round results are used instead.
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PC =  l.MV as our measure of political competition. As a further strategy, similarly
to the methodology of Galasso and Nannicini (2011), we also compute an alternative
measure of political contestability: the margin of victory using the municipality-specific
vote share of center-right and center-left coalitions in previous regional council elections.
In regional elections, voters cast two separate votes: one for the governor, and one for
the regional council party lists. It is reasonable to assume that when voters decide on the
council elections, they tend to vote more ideologically, as opposed to when they decide on
governors and instead put more weight on candidates’ personal attributes and charisma.
So, the former (the council elections) should constitute a good representation of the ex
ante distribution of ideologies across municipalities.
Insert table 2 in about here
To ensure that our results are e↵ectively driven by political competition rather than by
municipalities’ other political attributes, we employ additional political controls. First, to
take into account a mayor’s political preferences, we construct an indicator variable, a local
government coalition dummy, taking the value of one if the mayor is supported by a left-
wing coalition and zero otherwise. Second, to control for the e↵ect of central government
policy preferences on local tax setting, we include a central government coalition dummy
taking the value of one if the central government is run by a left-wing coalition and zero
otherwise. To test for a possible alignment e↵ect on tax policies (occurring when the
mayor shares the same political coalition with either the prime minister or the governor
of the region), we construct two alignment dummies, taking the value of one if the mayor
is aligned and zero otherwise. To address the issue that tax setting may exhibit a cyclical
behavior, we include an electoral cycle control, which measures the number of years from
the last election (i.e., the variable takes value of zero the year of the election, one the
following year, and so on, with the maximum value being four and corresponding to
the year before new elections). Finally, because term-limited mayors may face di↵erent
incentives compared to mayors seeking re-election, we include an incumbent dummy,
which is equal to one if the mayor is at her second mandate and zero otherwise.17 Detailed
summary statistics for these variables are presented in Table 2.
Insert table 3 in about here
Other control variables we employ in the regressions are the following:
17Mayors are allowed to serve for, at most, two consecutive terms.
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1. Socio-demographic and geographical variables: resident population, proportion of
the population less than 14 and over 65 years old, proportion of residents with a
university degree and proportion illiterate, and discrete variables measuring the ge-
ographical characteristics of the municipality.18 These variables are collected from
the Statistical Atlas of Municipalities, issued annually by the Italian National Sta-
tistical Institute (ISTAT).
2. Economic variables : total income from real estate, total income from sources other
than from real estate, percentage of resident taxpayers, and the proportion of un-
employed, of self-employed, and of residents working for the service sector. The
sources for these variables are ISTAT, and the Ministry of Finance.
3. Public finance variables: municipalities’ total public expenditures, total grants from
the central and regional governments, and government deficits. Public expenditures
and deficits are lagged by one year in the empirical model. The sources for these
variables are the Italian ministries of finance and of internal a↵airs.
We observe a lot of variation in the data, including the size of the municipalities, demo-
graphic characteristics, economic profiles, and political and public finance characteristics.
Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in Table 3.
4 Empirical Strategy and Main Results
4.1 A Test on Salience
We start by using the data to understand which of the various sources of revenues is
“salient,” i.e., fully discounted by taxpayers in their voting behaviour. Our hypothesis is
that taxes such as the property tax and the waste disposal tax, which are paid in one or
two lump-sum payments, are more salient than fees and charges.19
18These are an indicator for the average height of the municipality above sea level (altimetric zone)
and an indicator for urbanization.
19In the case of Italy, the saliency of the property tax is quite evident. In fact, we may recall how
the property tax ICI has been at the centre of the political debate. During the embattled 2006 electoral
campaign, the leading centre-right candidate Silvio Berlusconi narrowed his disadvantage in the polls
by making a lastminute promise to abolish ICI for owners-occupiers. In 2007, the (narrowly) winning
center-left coalition increased the tax allowance on this tax, making most taxpayers exempt. In 2008,
new elections were called, and Berlusconi’s coalition won the elections on a platform that included the
property tax exemption for owners-occupiers. One may argue that, as the financial crisis hit Italy, much of
the unpopularity of the technocratic Monti government in 2013 could have been ascribed to its decision to
reform and substantially hike property-related taxes. The mayoral electoral campaigns often concentrate
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To verify this intuition, we estimate the mayors’ popularity equation, i.e., we estimate
the probability of an incumbent’s re-election as a function of sources of tax revenues. Our
empirical strategy, in this case, is to estimate the following probit model considering only
the subsample of the electoral years (denoted by the subscript e).
Iie =  ⌧ie +  Fie + !
0Zie + ve + ⇠ie; (15)
In equation (15) Iie = 1 if the incumbent in municipality i is re-elected and zero
otherwise, ⌧ie and Fie are measures of (implicit) rates for various local taxes and fees
respectively. Also, Zie is a matrix of control variables, including the whole set of controls
reported in Table 3. Finally, ve is a year dummy and ⇠ie is an i.i.d. error term.20
If, as this paper maintains, mayors’ actions are driven by the relative salience of tax
instruments,, then we should expect   to be negative and significant, and   non-significant.
This empirical exercise also allows us to verify that voting behavior is not consistent with
other alternative hypotheses. According to Hettich and Winer (1984, 1988), politicians
choose the revenue mix in order to minimize the political cost of taxation; this implies that
in equilibrium the marginal electoral cost of each source of taxation should be equalized,
and that revenue sources that are politically less damaging should be used more intensely.
Similarly, and coherently with a more recent political economy literature, one could argue
that mayors do this by targeting taxation towards specific groups that are electorally less
relevant. Specifically, this could mean that the incumbent mayor would target a specific
group of voters who prefer low (property) taxes and high fees.If mayors in our dataset
behaved consistently with Hettich and Winer (1984,1988), we would expect both taxes
and fees to have detrimental e↵ects on the probability of the incumbent mayor winning
election, i.e., we would expect both   and   to be negative and significant. If instead
the idea that the revenue mix depends on group targeting than we should expect   to be
negative, and   to be positive. If our hypothesis of salient taxes and non-salient fees is
correct, we should expect that voters will change their voting behavior only in response
to (property) tax setting, but, by contrast, will be unresponsive to fee setting.
Table 4 reports point estimates for the coe cients  s and  s. We present regression
results for two definitions of incumbent: incumbent candidate21 and incumbent party.22
on ICI tax rates and exemptions.
20Standard errors are clustered at municipal level, clustering at provincial level produce almost identical
results.
21In this case, we consider only incumbents who can run for re-election, i.e., we exclude all the cases
where the mayor cannot seek re-election because of term limits. So, under this definition Iie is equal to
one if the incumbent mayor is re-elected for the second time and, zero otherwise.
22In this case, we use a broad definition of incumbent under which the incumbent is the mayor’s party
rather than the person of the mayor. Under this definition Iie is equal to one if the winning mayor in
elections held at time e+ 1 in municipality i belongs to the same coalition as the winner of the elections
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In columns 1 and 4, the regressions are run without Zie, and in columns 2, 3,5, and
6, the matrix of additional controls is included. Consistent with our hypothesis on the
use of fiscal instruments according to their degree of salience, we can clearly note that
the probability of an incumbent re-election is always negatively a↵ected by salient tax
instruments (property taxes, waste-disposal and other taxes). However, we observe a
statistically significant result only for the property tax setting; in particular, our regression
results show that a 1 percent increase in the property tax rate negatively a↵ects the
probability of incumbent re-election by between 9 percent (using the broad definition of
incumbent) and 16 percent (using the stricter definition of incumbent). For all the other
measures of fees there is, with some specifications, evidence of a positive impact on the
probability of re-election; in particular, we observe a positive and statistically significant
impact in the case of fees for local services. The finding is in contrast to the hypothesis
regarding group targeting, and confirms the scarce electoral salience of fees as opposed to
the property tax.23
Insert table 4 in about here
.
4.2 Tax Ratio Equation
We then turn our attention to our main predictions, i.e. that political competition shifts
policymakers’ choices toward the use of the less salient fiscal instruments. We first look
at the link between the preferred mix of own fiscal revenue and the degree of political
competition. We do this by estimating the tax ratio equation, TR, and then estimating
the determination of taxes and fees items separately.
The driving mechanism illustrated by our model is that political competition changes
policymakers’ incentives regarding how to raise tax revenue. In particular, our theoretical
predictions suggest that when electoral competition is strong, mayors raise a higher pro-
portion of tax revenue by increasing the less-salient instruments (Testable Prediction 2)
and reducing the use of the salient ones (Testable Prediction 1) compared to the case when
electoral competition is low. To examine this link empirically we estimate regressions of
the form:
at time e; this is quite consistent with the commonplace scenario in which the deputy mayor steps in
when the incumbent mayor cannot seek re-election.
23We have tried to estimate equation (15) using the MV as a dependent variable. We obtain similar
results, which are available upon request
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TRit = ↵i + vt +  PCit +  
0Zit + "it (16)
where TRit represents the proportion of the salient instrument as a share of overall
fiscal revenues (⌧1/(⌧1 + ⌧2)) in municipality i at time t, PCit is our measure of political
competition, Zit is a matrix of controls described in Section 3.3, ↵i and vt are municipality
and year e↵ects, and "it is an i.i.d. error term. We estimate the panel data model reported
in equation (16)using the Feasible-GLS estimator and Mundlak (1978) approach. This
approach consists of including among the regressors municipal means of each time-variant
variable. This allows to include time invariant variables as regressors 24 and obtain, at the
same time, estimates equivalent to those from the Within-the-Group estimator. Finally,
we report robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the municipal level.
The baseline results are presented in Tables 5 and A4. In Table 5 our measure of
political competition is constructed on the lagged MV in mayoral elections, while in
Table A4 we use the lagged values of MV calculated on regional elections.
We believe that the mayors’ fiscal choices do not a↵ect voting behavior in (previously
held) municipal or regional-council elections, and that our measures of political com-
petition are exogenous to the tax-setting behavior of mayors. Nevertheless, to further
exclude any source of possible endogeneity of political competition and fiscal choices, and
to include a further model specification, we also use an IV approach, instrumenting the
mayoral election margin of victory with the regional council election margin of victory.
The results of these regressions are relegated to the Appendix, and are fully consistent
with our main results.25
Starting from Table 5: the first column contains estimates of the basic specification in
equation (16). We find a strong positive link between the extent of political competition
and tax policy decisions. For example, in this specification, without other controls, a
1 percentage point increase in incumbent’s political competition is associated with a
decrease in the tax ratio of 0.15 percentage points.
The remaining columns of Table 5 present the results when additional controls are
added to the baseline specification in equation (16). In particular, in column two, we
include our political variables: the incumbent, the alignment dummies, the local govern-
ment coalition dummy, and the electoral cycle dummy. We propose two variations to
model electoral cycles; first, by using individual year-from-an election dummies (columns
24These are variables include the rural degree and the altimetric zone, for example.
25Other authors have used IV approaches as well: Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010) uses the share
of population in U.S. states subject either to a literacy test or a poll tax as an instrument for political
competition at state level. Fiva and Natvik (2013) uses election results in neighburing municipalities as
an instrument for political competition in each municipality in Norway. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2009)
uses past national election results as an instrument for local political contestability.
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(2) and (4) ), second by employing a quadratic function in years from an election (columns
(3) and (5) ). In columns (4) and (5), the political dummies are interacted with our po-
litical competition measure, PC, and augmented with the full set of controls described in
the previous section.
Some other results warrant emphasis: First, consistent with Testable Prediction 3,
when expressed in term of a quadratic function, electoral cycles play an important role
in shaping revenue-mix decisions, with all the related coe cients being highly significant.
The interpretation of this result is that the substitution between fees and taxes occurs
mainly in the years close to elections, and wanes to its minimum around the middle of the
five-year period. Second, there is no evidence that left-wing and right-wing mayors behave
di↵erently from one another when they make decisions on the source of fiscal revenues.
Third, a mayor who cannot seek re-election in the following term because of term limits
(i.e. incumbent equal to one) is less likely to rely heavily on fees rather than on taxes,
especially when electoral competition is high, which is in line with Testable Prediction 3.
Moreover, our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of additional controls as shown in
the last two columns of Table 5.
Insert table 5 in about here
In order to check whether our results are sensitive to the way ex ante political con-
testability is measured, we repeat the same regressions as the ones displayed in Table
5 using an alternative measure of political competition, based on the regional elections’
margin of victory. The main feature is that there is not substantial di↵erence in the es-
timated coe cients in the two tables, in terms of sign, significance and magnitude. The
coe cients for these estimates are displayed in Table A4 in the Appendix.
Finally, one may argue that re-elected mayors are better in providing services when
using certain types of fiscal tools rather than when using other fiscal tools, and that this is
driving our main results. To explore this possibility, we replicate the regressions displayed
in Table 5 using only the subset of re-elected mayors, i.e., mayors in their second (and
last) term in o ce.The outcomes from this exercise are displayed in Table 6.
Insert table 6 in about here
The results in Table 6 are very similar to those displayed in Table 5. There is no
detectable di↵erence in the use of fiscal revenues by first-term and re-elected mayors; the
25We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this route.
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results confirm that the substitution of revenue sources is driven by contestability rather
than by selection (i.e. re-election).
Another possibility is that mayors’ strategic behavior may originate from the supply
of goods and services as well. We explore this possibility by re-running equation (16)
using municipality current expenditures per capita as a dependent variable instead of the
tax ratio. The results indicate very clearly that the level of political contestability does
not a↵ect the level of public spending. The outcomes for this exercise are displayed in
in Table A5 in the Appendix. In synthesis, the emerging picture confirms our hypothesis
that mayors who are in more competitive municipalities, and in the period of elections,
substitute the more visible and politically “costly” source of revenues (taxes) with the
less-salient fees.
4.3 Tax and Fee Setting Behavior
In the previous section we established that the use of taxes will be relatively low (high)
compared to the use of fees when electoral competition is high (low); in this section,
we examine decision making concerning specific taxes and fees in term of their absolute
value. Our theory clearly predicts that, as electoral contestability increases, taxes should
decrease, and fees should rise. The model we now estimate is:
yit = ↵i + vt + 'PCit + !
0Zit + "it;) yit = ⌧it, Fit (17)
where yit is in turn equal to the various specific tax and fee variables, Zit is the matrix
of controls employed in the previous sets of regressions, ↵i and vt are fixed e↵ects and
time dummies and "it the error. PCit is our measure of political contestability,26 so the
coe cient of interest is '. The expected sign for ' is negative for the salient taxes (in
particular the property tax) and positive for the less salient fees.
Insert table 7 in about here
The results are displayed in Table 7: the first three columns report the estimated co-
e cients when our dependent variable is a measure of our salient instruments (property,
waste-management tax, and other taxes, respectively), and the last two columns present
the results for the non-salient instruments (fees for local services and other fees). As the
26In this section we present results when political competition is proxied by lagged MV in municipal
elections, results for MV calculated on regional elections are in Table A4 in the Appendix.
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table clearly shows, the results are consistent with our hypothesis: if political competi-
tion increases 1 percentage point, on one hand, the revenues from property taxes, waste
disposal and other taxes decrease by 0.53, 0.44, and 0.19 euros per capita, respectively;
however, the latter two are not significantly di↵erent from zero. On the other hand, rev-
enues from fees increase by about the same amount, by 0.66 euros per capita for fees for
local services, and by 0.18 euros per capita for other fees ; the latter is not significant.
Note also that, consistent with the results discussed in the previous section, left and right
coalitions do not show di↵erent preferences regarding the set of fiscal instruments.
4.4 Alternative measures for property tax: residents vs. non
residents
To provide further support to our hypotheses, we look into the e↵ect of electoral compe-
tition on the tax rates of the most salient tax: the ICI property tax. Municipalities apply
a reduced tax rate to residents (who are also voters), as opposed to non-residents (who
cannot vote). If our hypotheses are correct, we should expect that electoral competition
should more strongly a↵ect the decision on the (resident) reduced tax rate, and have a
smaller e↵ect (if any) to the non-resident standard rate.
Insert table 8 in about here
Table 8 reports regression results for equation (17) when our dependent variable, ⌧ , is
in turn the standard non-resident property tax rate, and the reduced resident property tax
rate. In the same model our main explanatory variable, political competition, is calculated
on the laggedMV of municipal elections. The table shows that political competition only
a↵ects the reduced tax rate; a 1 percent increase in the level of political competition has a
negative impact on reduced tax rates of about 0.53 percentage points. Note that, from the
inspection of Table 1, the average reduced rate is 0.5 percent while the average standard
rate is 0.6 percent. Therefore, it is clear that the e↵ect of political competition on the
former is larger. Moreover, this e↵ect appears highly sensitive to the position in the
electoral cycle. Figures 1a and 1b plot the combined coe cient of PC for each year of the
electoral cycle, as displayed in columns (2) and (3) of Table 8. The graphs show how the
impact of political competition on the reduced tax rate changes with the electoral cycle,
reaching its minimum value (per percentage point of political competition) in the year
before the election, and becoming much weaker in the middle of the electoral cycle. Note
23
also that using individual-year dummies or a quadratic function to represent the electoral
cycle does not a↵ect the shape of the graph. By contrast, there is no e↵ect of political
competition on the standard tax rate, which is consistent with our hypothesis (Testable
Prediction 3).
Insert Figure 1a and 1b in about here
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Partisan preferences and close races
In Section 4 we have shown that revenue choices are shaped by the degree of political
competition rather than by party preferences. This is also in line with our theoretical
predictions. The results displayed in tables 5-8 suggest that this is the case, because the
local government coalition dummy is always not significant. However, because this is an
important point, we investigate it further.27
Our empirical strategy to identify a coalition e↵ect is to exploit the fact that the may-
ors’ victory changes discontinuously at 0 percent of mayoral candidates’ victory margin.
This allows us to identify a possible coalition e↵ect in tax- and fee-setting behavior by
implementing a regression discontinuity design (RDD) on the margin of victory of one
coalition over the other, by comparing municipalities where center-left (center-right) may-
ors have barely won the elections against a center-right (center-left) opponent. In other
words, the focus is on left and right candidates’ races decided by a narrow margin. Lee
(2001, 2008) shows that this approach represents quasi-random variation in candidate
winner, because, as long as there is some unpredictability in voting behavior, when the
race is very tight, the winner is likely to be determined by pure chance.
More formally, we compute the margin of victory for the center-right candidate (MVR)
in each municipality: positive (negative) values indicate that a center-right, R, (center-left,
L) candidate has won the election. Note that the probability of having a center-right-wing
mayor has a sharp discontinuity equal to 1 at the thresholdMVR = 0. So RDD estimates
the e↵ect of the mayor’s party-coalition on tax- and fee-setting behavior. Note that, also
in this specification the margin of victory is lagged because municipal elections usually
27One could argue, for example, that there could be a correlation between the margin of victory,
our measure of political contestability, and coalition identity, and that, therefore, we could erroneously
attribute the choice of the revenue mix to political competition rather than to party preferences.
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take place in April-May of year n, while fiscal variables of year n depend on decisions
made in December of year n-1.
There are various ways in which RDD can be implemented. In what follows we present
two di↵erent approaches. First, following Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), we use the whole
sample available, and we regress our dependent variable on a pth-order polynomial in the
control function, in addition to the binary treatment indicator. Because we are interested
in the e↵ect of political coalitions on taxes and fees setting, our dependent variable is
TRit, previously defined. The model we estimate takes the following form
TRit =  0Ri,t + f(MVRi,t)'+ ⇢
0Zi,t + vt + µi + ⇠i,t (18)
where R is our center-right coalition dummy that takes value of one if the mayor ruling
municipality i is supported by a center-right coalition, this is our treatment variable.
The coalition e↵ect is estimated controlling for the margin of victory under a di↵erent
hypothesis on its functional form f(MVR)28 as well as the interaction of all of these
terms with R. Finally Z is the vector of control variables employed in the previous set of
regressions, ⇠i,t the error terms (standard errors are clustered at municipal level), vt is a
year dummy, and µi is the unobserved heterogeneity. We treat µi as a municipality fixed
e↵ect. The coe cient of interest,  0 in equation (18), represent the coalition e↵ect at zero
threshold.
Imbens and Lemieux (2008) raise a possible concern with the above estimation method:
that it may be sensitive to outcome values for observations far away from the threshold.
To address this we also implement the local linear regression approach, which restricts the
sample to municipalities in the intervalMVRi,t 2 [ h,+h], where h is an optimally chosen
bandwidth, here selected following the methodology suggested by Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik (2014).29 So, the second model we estimate is as follows:
TRit = ⇢0 + ⇢1Ri,t +  0MVRi,t +  1Ri,t ⇥MVRi,t + ⌫t + µi + ⇠i,t (19)
where ⌫t are year e↵ects, µi municipalities fixed e↵ects, ⇠i,t the error terms, standard
errors are clustered at municipal level. ⇢1 is our coe cient of interest and identifies the
coalition e↵ect at the zero threshold.
Results of the estimation of  0 in equation (18) and ⇢1 in equation (19) are reported
in Table 9; we experiment di↵erent specifications of the two models, which include or
exclude the full set of controls and the fixed e↵ects, and we present the results using up to
third degree polynomial orders 30 equation (18) and also doubling the optimal bandwidth
28Our control function is: f(MVRit) =  01MVRit +  02MVR2it + ... +  0pMVR
p
it +  1RitMVRit +
 2RitMVR2it + ...+  pRitMVR
p.
29This is implemented using the STATA command rdrobust.
30Gelman and Imbens (2014) show that using high-order polynomials should be avoided.
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in equation (19) as a further robustness check.
Insert table 9 in about here
The table shows that there is not a clear di↵erence in behavior regarding the tax-ratio
setting by left-and-right wing mayors - as estimated around the zero threshold. Both
models presents similar results.
We also report the graphical analysis. Figure 2a displays a graphical representation
of equation (18), by reporting running-mean smoothing (separately on either side of the
threshold) for the percentage of votes won by the incumbent mayor in the latest election
(on the horizontal axis) and the tax ratio (on the vertical axis). The visual analysis of
the data and the cross-validation procedure (proposed by Lee, Lemieux, 2010) always
suggests using a bandwidth of 0.02 or more, therefore, in order to make the graphical rep-
resentation more e↵ective, 50 bins are reported in all figures. The figures also help with
the visualization of the estimated equations with respect to the presence of a discontinuity
at the cuto↵ point, and the relationship between outcome and assignment variable. In
particular, Figure 2a refers to equation (18) and highlights no clear evidence of a discon-
tinuity at the cuto↵ point for TR and a U-shaped relationship between the outcome and
the assignment variable. This latter finding confirms that both left- and right-wing may-
ors behave similarly vis-a-vis electoral competition, relying more strongly on taxes when
competition is weaket. Figure 2b shows graphical analysis for equation (19) implemented
using the optimal bandwidth and shows no clear evidence of a significant discontinuity in
TR around the threshold.
Insert figures 2a and 2b in about here
One important validity test for regression discontinuity estimates is to check whether
the density of the running variable is continuous at the threshold. The underlying as-
sumption that generates the local random assignment result is that each individual has
imprecise control over the assignment variable. An intuitive test of this assumption is
whether the aggregate distribution of the assignment variable is discontinuous, since a
mixture of individual-level continuous densities is itself a continuous density. Using Mc-
Crary (2008) procedure, Figure A1 in the Appendix shows a graph of the raw densities
computed over bins with a bandwidth of 0.01 (100 bins in the graph), along with a smooth
2nd-order polynomial model. The graphs show no evidence of discontinuity at the cuto↵
confirmed also by a formal RD regression using polynomials up to the 4th-order in the
control function.
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Another important test for the validity of the RD design is to examine whether the
covariates do not exhibit any discontinuity in relation to the margin of victory. As sug-
gested by Lee and Lemieux (2010) we test the null of discontinuities in all covariates
simultaneously estimating a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) where each equation
represents a di↵erent baseline covariate, and then performing chi-square test for the dis-
continuity gaps in all equations being zero. As reported in Table A6 in the Appendix
we cannnot reject the null hypothesis of zero discontinuity in all covariates in relation to
almost all polynomial orders of the margin of victory.
6 Conclusions
This paper has explored the link between electoral competition and tax-setting behavior.
In particular, we have analyzed the choices mayors make about the mix of taxes they use,
and how these choices are a↵ected by electoral incentives.
When collecting revenues, mayors can often decide among a number of tax instruments
characterized by di↵erent levels of salience (e.g., property taxes as opposed to fees and
charges). Because voters are less likely to take notice of the less salient charges, they
are also less likely to impute them to the mayor’s political responsibility. Our theoretical
model predicts that mayors facing stronger electoral competition choose to rely relatively
more on less salient revenue sources to decrease the overall “electoral cost” of raising
funds. On the other hand, mayors facing moderate electoral competition have less of an
incentive to hide their sources of revenues from voters, and rely relatively more on salient
revenue sources.
These findings are confirmed by our empirical analysis, which focuses on the choices
on revenue mixes made by Italian mayors in the period from 1999 to 2008. We use data
to explore which sources of revenues are more salient. We find that the property tax is
the most salient tax instrument; by contrast, fees and charges are among the least salient.
We then explore the link between electoral competition and tax-mix choices. We find that
mayors who won with a narrower margin of victory, i.e., those who faced a sti↵er electoral
competition, were more likely to increase the proportion of revenue coming from fees, as
opposed to taxes. The reverse also holds true; mayors who won with broader margin are
less likely to resort to fees over taxes. Moreover, we find that this behavior is una↵ected
by the political a liation of the mayor.
These results enrich our understanding of the interplay between electoral incentives
and political accountability. Elections are commonly seen as a positive force that im-
proves political selection and disciplines politicians. This is challenged by our findings:
if policymakers can choose between an array of policy instruments with various degrees
of salience, they will also disproportionately use the least salient tool when their election
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is at greater risk (localities in which either party could win with a small margin of vic-
tory) or when voters are more sensitive to policy decisions (in the pre-election period).
This, in turn, weakens the positive role that elections are playing in keeping politicians
accountable to voters.
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Appendix
Proofs
Lemma 2
A generic voter i votes for the incumbent if:
U2(a
e) Xi > E[U2(a)], i.e. Xi  U2(ae)  E[U2(a)]
As voters’ ideology Xj is uniformly distributed, we can calculate the vote share for the
incumbent mayor as
V =
1
2
+ ⇣[U2(a
e)  Ea[U2(a)]  ⌘ˆ] (20)
To calculate the probability of winning we can updated re-arrange the expression of V to
obtain the values of ⌘ such that at least 50% of votes are obtained:
1
2
+ ⇣i[U2(a
e)  Ea[U2(a)]  ⌘ˆ] > 1
2
(21)
⌘ˆ < U2(a
e)  Ea[U2(a)] (22)
Knowing the distribution of ⌘, one can easily calculate:
p =
1
2
+  [U2(a
e)  Ea[U2(a)]] (23)
Proof of Testable Predictions
Proof of Testable Predictions 1 and 2
As we refer to a representative municipality, we drop the municipality-specific subscript
i. All subscripts refer to the time periods.
Let us first recall (see Eq. [8]) that voters’ Period Two equilibrium utility is increasing
in the mayor’s ability. Let us now recall the incumbent mayor’s inter-temporal utility
function:
UM = ⇢+ cM1 + v(G1) + p (⇢+ U
M
2 (a
M)) + (1  p) Ea[U2(a)]
where UM2 is the utility in case of re-election, and Ea[U2(a)] is the utility in case of electoral
defeat (which is an expectation over the distribution of ability in the pool of potential
candidates).
From Eqs. (6)-(7) we know that the second-period decision on the two tax instruments
depends on the ability of the mayor and are anticipated by voters. For a given belief a on
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the ability of the incumbent mayor, we define therefore v2(a) as the Period Two utility
from public good consumption, and U2(a) as the Period Two representative voter’s utility.
Similarly, as ability is a random variable with unknown realization but known distribution,
we define the expectation operator Ea as the expectation over the probability distribution
function of a.
From Eq (12), we can also calculate:
@p
@⌧11
= 0 (24)
@p
@⌧21
=  
@[U2(ae)  Ea[U2(a)]
@⌧21
(25)
with
@[U2(ae)  Ea[U2(a)]
@⌧21
= (1  s)v02(ae) (26)
which leads us to the period-one first-order conditions:
@UM
@⌧11
: (v01   1  d0) = 0 (27)
@UM
@⌧21
: (v01   1   0) +  (1  s) v02(ae)
 
UM2 (a
M) + ⇢  Ea[U2(a)]
 
= 0 (28)
Totally di↵erentiating the first order conditions (27)-(28) with respect to  , one ob-
tains: "
UM⌧11⌧11 U
M
⌧11⌧21
UM⌧11⌧21 U
M
⌧22⌧22
#"
d⌧⇤11/d 
d⌧⇤21/d 
#
=  
"
UM⌧11 
UM⌧21 
#
with
UM⌧11⌧11 = v
00
1   d00 < 0
UM⌧21⌧21 = v
00
1    00 +  (1  s)2 v002(ae)(UM2 (aM) + ⇢  Ea[U2(a)]) < 0
UM⌧11⌧21 = v
00
1 < 0
UM⌧11 = 0
UM⌧21 = (1  s) v02(ae)(UM2 (aM) + ⇢  Ea[U2(a)]) > 0
The determinant of the above matrix, which we can call |D|, is strictly positive by the
concavity assumption. Again by assumption all the elements of the Hessian matrix are
negative. From which we can calculate that d⌧
⇤
11/d < 0, and that d⌧
⇤
21/d > 0.
Proof of Testable Prediction 3
We can also observe that in case s = 1 the first-order conditions are identical across period
(compare Eqs. [13-14] with Eqs. [6-7]). We can therefore apply the same technique as
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above, as if doing a comparative statics exercise with respect to s. The matrix form
simultaneous equations can be written as:"
UM⌧11⌧11 U
M
⌧11⌧21
UM⌧11⌧21 U
M
⌧22⌧22
#"
d⌧⇤11/ds
d⌧⇤21/ds
#
=  
"
0
  v0(ae) UM2 (aM)
#
which implies that d⌧
⇤
11/ds > 0 and d⌧
⇤
21/ds < 0, i.e. as salience increases (or as we pass
from Period One to Period Two) ⌧1 increases and ⌧2 decreases. As Period One (period 2)
proxies an electoral (non-electoral) year, the third testable prediction is proved.
Further Robustness Tests: IV Analysis
An endogeneity bias in our estimates might arise if the degree of political competition at
municipal level is influenced by local fiscal policy decisions. Possible endogeneity issues of
the municipal margin of victory are addressed by running instrumental variables regres-
sions using regional electoral margin of victory at the municipal level as strictly exogenous
instrument.
Our strategy is to estimate the tax ratio equation in model (16) and the property tax
rate equation in model (17) instrumenting our measure of municipal political competi-
tion (PCi) with the regional elections’ margin of victory. The strict exogeneity of the
instruments is ensured by the nature of the variables, being determined only by regional
politics.
Table A7 reports the results, every model is run twice: the first time allowing for a
constant term, time and municipal fixed e↵ects only; the second time adding all controls.
Finally the last two columns report the first stage regressions.
The instrumental variables regressions confirm the previous evidence of the negative
impact that political competition exerts on the tax ration and on the level of the property
tax.
Finally, the first stage of the 2SLS reveals that most of the variation across municipal
political competition is explained by the local political orientation captured by the regional
election results. The estimated coe cient is highly significant and the positive sign is in
line with the prior. Both the underidentification test and the weak identification reported
in the last two lines of column five provide a formal test for the validity of our IV analysis.
Tables and Figures
Insert tables A1-A7 in about here
Insert figure A1 in about here
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Tables 
 
Table 1 - Summary statistics of dependent variables (regression sample) 
 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Tax ratio (salient taxes over total local taxes 
and fees), % 65.87 10.90 22.15 92.25 
Property tax, real euro per capita 209.31 90.25 8.22 647.96 
Property tax rate (reduced rate), %o 5.02 0.66 0 7 
Property tax rate (standard rate), %o 6.39 0.66 4 7 
Waste management taxes, real euro per 
capita 102.39 70.93 0 976.22 
Other taxes (municipal income tax, electrical 
surcharge) real euro per capita 53.51 34.74 0 278.07 
Local Fees for General services  (excluding 
waste management) real euro per capita 175.00 111.04 10.51 848.26 
Local Fees for Other services - real euro per 
capita 27.90 30.41 0 260.06 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Summary statistics of political variables (regression sample) 
 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Margin of victory (municipal election), % 18.86 16.07 0.03 74.27 
Margin of victory (regional election, at 
municipal level), % 18.95 12.89 0.04 63.13 
Alignment dummy  
1=local gov. aligned with central gov. 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Incumbent dummy - 1 = the incumbent is 
reelected (second term) 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Local government coalition, 1=left, 0=right 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Electoral cycle, year from election 2.02 1.30 0 5 
Central government coalition, 1=left, 0=right 0.34 0.47 0 1 
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Table 3 - Summary statistics of control variables (regression sample) 
 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Resident population 57,298 160,217 14,650 2,769,012 
Population below 15, % over total pop. 14.63 3.23 8.24 28.80 
Population over 65, % over total pop. 17.24 4.49 3.80 29.53 
*Illiterate people, % over total pop. 1.32 1.15 0.18 7.71 
*Graduates, % over total pop. 6.89 2.89 1.53 17.29 
Income (no real estate) real euro per-capita 16,827.27 3,283.64 7,602.59 32,319.21 
Income from real estate 1,736.37 532.42 537.18 4,389.78 
% of resident taxpayers 83.24 3.55 69.22 93.20 
*Unemployed, % over total active pop. 12.48 9.48 2.55 49.30 
*Service sector workers, % over total 
workers 61.59 10.29 23.79 84.59 
*Self-employed workers, % over total 
workers 23.16 3.93 13.78 39.14 
Total current grants, real euro per-capita 246.18 147.75 3.60 1,217.15 
Local current expenditure, real euro per-
capita 829.58 227.71 30.54 1,856.29 
Deficit, real euro per-capita. 170.81 239.13 0 2,404.12 
*Rural degree, 1=low, 3=high 2.39 0.61 1 3 
*Altimetirc zone, 1=low, 5 = high 4.08 1.11 1 5 
 
*Time invariant 
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Table 4 - Probit m
odel, dependent variables = 1 if the incum
bent is re-elected 0 otherw
ise 
  
in
cu
m
ben
t can
didate 
in
cu
m
ben
t party 
  
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Property tax (redu
ced residen
t tax rate)  (1) 
-10.638 
-8.935 
-16.414 
-11.354 
-9.552 
-9.880 
  
(0.000)*** 
(0.002)*** 
(0.001)*** 
(0.000)*** 
(0.000)*** 
(0.006)*** 
W
aste m
an
ag. Taxes (im
plicit tax rate)  (2) 
-3.872 
-1.602 
-0.160 
-4.511 
-0.127 
-2.372 
  
(0.331) 
(0.701) 
(0.990) 
(0.230) 
(0.974) 
(0.782) 
O
th
er taxes (im
plicit tax rate)  (2) 
-13.450 
-16.823 
-10.138 
-4.541 
-8.690 
-10.803 
  
(0.298) 
(0.184) 
(0.584) 
(0.721) 
(0.472) 
(0.427) 
O
th
er fees (im
plicit tax rate)  (2) 
12.263 
10.315 
-1.051 
-1.859 
-5.678 
0.813 
  
(0.319) 
(0.400) 
(0.953) 
(0.855) 
(0.553) 
(0.940) 
Fees for local services (im
plicit tax rate)  (2) 
5.740 
1.839 
-1.534 
8.484 
0.375 
-6.528 
  
(0.026)** 
(0.503) 
(0.843) 
(0.007)*** 
(0.910) 
(0.277) 
Years du
m
m
y 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
C
on
trols A
 
n
o 
yes 
yes 
n
o 
yes 
yes 
C
on
trols B
 
n
o 
n
o 
yes 
n
o 
n
o 
yes 
O
bservation
s 
567 
567 
220 
721 
721 
342 
Pesu
do R
-squ
ared 
0.085 
0.103 
0.089 
0.128 
0.170 
0.073 
N
otes. D
epen
den
t variable: in
cu
m
ben
t re-elected equ
al to on
e an
d zero oth
erw
ise. A
ll in
depen
den
t variables are expressed in
 term
s of variation
 rate w
ith
 respect to th
e valu
e 
registered in
 th
e year before th
e election
. S
tan
dard errors in
 paren
th
eses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. C
on
trols A
 variables in
clu
de: residen
t popu
lation
, %
 of popu
lation
 
below
 15, %
 of popu
lation
 over 65, In
com
e from
 real estate (real eu
ro per capita), in
com
e from
 oth
er sou
rces (real eu
ro per capita). C
on
trols B
 variables in
clu
de: total cu
rren
t 
gran
ts (real eu
ro per-capita lagged), local cu
rren
t expen
ditu
re (real eu
ro per-capita lagged), deficit (real eu
ro per-capita lagged). A
ll coefficien
ts can
 be in
terpreted as th
e ch
an
ge 
in
 th
e probability of re-election
 after a 1%
 ch
an
ge in
 th
e tax rates. 
(1) Th
e redu
ced property tax rate is th
e tax rate relevan
t for residen
t taxpayers sin
ce it is applied on
ly on
 th
e m
ain
 dw
ellin
gs. 
(2) Th
e im
plicit tax rate is com
pu
ted as th
e ratio betw
een
 th
e tax reven
u
e an
d th
e total declared in
com
e at m
u
n
icipal level. 
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Table 5. Tax Ratio Regressions (all sample) 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
            
PC (political competition) 
-
0.144*** 
-
0.140*** 
-
0.140*** 
-
0.165*** -0.154*** 
  (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0436) (0.0418) 
State Alignment Dummy (=1 if local gov.  
aligned  0.316 0.344 0.0134 -0.0296 
 with central gov.)  (0.276) (0.274) (0.539) (0.535) 
PC X State Alignment Dummy    0.00326 
-
0.000362 
     (0.0260) (0.0249) 
Incumbent Dummy( =1 reelected incumbent   -0.0875 -0.0883 1.040 1.024 
second term)  (0.359) (0.359) (0.643) (0.644) 
PC X Incumbent Dummy    0.0554** 0.0545** 
     (0.0234) (0.0235) 
Local gov coalition (1= center lft, 0= center 
right)  1.046* 1.058* 0.406 0.369 
   (0.605) (0.606) (0.897) (0.903) 
PC X Local gov coalition    0.00118 -0.00169 
     (0.0451) (0.0450) 
Region Alignment Dummy (=1 if local gov.  
aligned  -0.159 -0.164 0.126 0.179 
 with regional  gov.)  (0.430) (0.431) (0.708) (0.710) 
PC X Region Alignment Dummy     0.00383 0.00838 
     (0.0309) (0.0306) 
Electoral Cycle (election year )  0.711**  0.787  
   (0.352)  (0.618)  
Electoral Cycle ( 1 year after  elections)  0.414  1.334**  
   (0.340)  (0.672)  
Electoral Cycle ( 2 years after  elections)  0.151  0.434  
   (0.323)  (0.592)  
Electoral Cycle ( 3 years after  elections)  -0.627  -0.418  
   (0.385)  (0.693)  
Electoral Cycle ( 4 years after  elections)  -0.212  -0.966  
   (1.612)  (2.433)  
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Table 5. Tax Ratio Regressions (all sample) 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
            
      
PC X Electoral Cycle (election year )    0.0160  
     (0.0289)  
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 1 year after  elections)    0.00876  
     (0.0337)  
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 2 years after  elections)    -0.0109  
     (0.0283)  
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 3 years after  elections)    
0.00048
7  
     (0.0243)  
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 4 years after  elections)    -0.407  
     (0.329)  
Electoral Cycle (continuus variable)   0.594**  1.098** 
    (0.276)  (0.504) 
Electoral Cycle Squared   
-
0.194***  -0.302** 
    (0.0687)  (0.121) 
PC X Electoral Cycle (continuus variable)     -0.00162 
      (0.0279) 
PC X Electoral Cycle Squared     
-
0.000144 
      (0.00669) 
            
Observations 2,852 2,852 2,852 1,975 1,975 
            
Municipal Dummmies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables No No No Yes Yes 
      
Notes. Dependent variable: Tax Ratio (%). PC is minus margin of victory calculated on previous mayoral 
elections. Clustered standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. Control variables include: resident population, % of population below 15, % of population over 65, 
Income from real estate (real euro per capita), income from other sources (real euro per capita), % of 
resident taxpayers, regional and national current grants (real euro per-capita), local current expenditure 
(real euro per-capita lagged), deficit (real euro per-capita lagged).   
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Table 6. Tax Ratio Regressions (sub-sample of winners) 
      
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
		 	     
		 		 		 		 		 		
PC (political competition) -0.131***	 -0.125***	 -0.125***	 -0.178***	 -0.166***	
		 (0.0255)	 (0.0256)	 (0.0255)	 (0.0490)	 (0.0484)	
State Alignment Dummy (=1 if local gov.  aligned  0.503	 0.534*	 0.205	 0.169	
 with central gov.)  (0.313)	 (0.308)	 (0.589)	 (0.582)	
PC X State Alignment Dummy    0.0139	 0.00923	
		 	   (0.0257)	 (0.0251)	
Incumbent Dummy( =1 reelected incumbent   0.0379	 0.0396	 1.238	 1.175	
second term)  (0.517)	 (0.517)	 (0.843)	 (0.845)	
PC X Incumbent Dummy    0.0572*	 0.0533*	
		 	   (0.0294)	 (0.0299)	
Local gov coalition (1= center lft, 0= center right)  1.502**	 1.524**	 1.335	 0.0533*	
   (0.746)	 (0.745)	 (1.055)	 (0.0299)	
PC X Local gov coalition    0.0337	 1.336	
		 	   (0.0595)	 (1.053)	
Region Alignment Dummy (=1 if local gov.  aligned  -0.308	 -0.308	 0.179	 0.236	
 with regional  gov.)  (0.475)	 (0.475)	 (0.759)	 (0.765)	
PC X Region Alignment Dummy     0.179	 0.236	
		 	   (0.759)	 (0.765)	
Electoral Cycle (election year )  0.653	 	 0.898	 	
   (0.407)	 	 (0.654)	 	
Electoral Cycle ( 1 year after  elections)  0.403	 	 1.437*	 	
   (0.393)	 	 (0.774)	 	
Electoral Cycle ( 2 years after  elections)  0.173	 	 0.472	 	
   (0.397)	 	 (0.738)	 	
Electoral Cycle ( 3 years after  elections)  -0.544	 	 -0.304	 	
   (0.454)	 	 (0.840)	 	
Electoral Cycle ( 4 years after  elections)  -1.450	 	 -1.780	 	
   (1.862)	 	 (3.125)	 	
PC X Electoral Cycle (election year )    0.0182	 	
     (0.0288)	 	
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 1 year after  elections)    0.00130	 	
     (0.0374)	 	
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 2 years after  elections)    -0.0215	 	
     (0.0341)	 	
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 3 years after  elections)    -0.00240	 	
     (0.0323)	 	
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 4 years after  elections)    -0.357	 	
     (0.417)	 	
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Table 6. Tax Ratio Regressions (sub-sample of winners) 
      
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
		 	     
		 		 		 		 		 		
   	 	 	
Electoral Cycle (continuus variable)   0.568*	 	 1.169**	
    (0.321)	 	 (0.584)	
Electoral Cycle Squared   -0.183**	 	 -0.317**	
    (0.0784)	 	 (0.135)	
PC X Electoral Cycle (continuus variable)     -0.00885	
      (0.0307)	
PC X Electoral Cycle Squared     0.00126	
		 	    (0.00718)	
		 		 		 		 		 		
Observations 2,346	 2,346	 2,346	 1,614	 1,614	
       
Municipal Dummmies Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Year Dummies Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Control Variables No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	
	      
Notes. Dependent variable: Tax Ratio (%). PC is minus margin of victory calculated on previous mayoral 
elections. Clustered standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. Control variables include: resident population, % of population below 15, % of population over 
65, Income from real estate (real euro per capita), income from other sources (real euro per capita), % of 
resident taxpayers, regional and national current grants (real euro per-capita), local current expenditure 
(real euro per-capita lagged), deficit (real euro per-capita lagged).   
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Table 7 - Sources of revenue regressions 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Property Tax 
Waste 
Manag. 
Tax 
Other 
Taxes 
Other 
Fees 
Fees for 
Local 
Services 
            
PC (political competition) -0.530* -0.449 -0.193 0.189 0.665** 
  (0.286) (0.308) (0.165) (0.130) (0.333) 
Electoral Cycle (election year ) 0.937 0.965 1.146 -0.647 -11.93*** 
  (3.672) (3.809) (2.594) (1.969) (4.040) 
Electoral Cycle ( 1 year after  elections) -2.956 2.427 2.033 -0.478 -11.03** 
  (3.583) (3.420) (2.359) (2.215) (4.583) 
Electoral Cycle ( 2 years after  elections) -1.426 -1.678 0.536 -0.568 -6.225 
  (3.507) (3.394) (2.559) (2.232) (3.924) 
Electoral Cycle ( 3 years after  elections) 1.639 1.735 -0.614 2.189 -0.962 
  (4.311) (3.979) (2.110) (2.344) (4.550) 
Electoral Cycle ( 4 years after  elections) 3.166 26.82** 7.873** 1.058 17.16 
  (7.292) (10.38) (3.433) (6.554) (11.40) 
PC X Electoral Cycle (election year ) 0.000897 0.123 0.0413 -0.0947 -0.410** 
  (0.151) (0.218) (0.105) (0.0997) (0.193) 
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 1 year after  elections) -0.246 0.181 0.0966 0.0134 -0.585*** 
  (0.159) (0.231) (0.105) (0.110) (0.222) 
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 2 years after  elections) -0.0177 0.114 -0.0844 -0.0389 -0.286 
  (0.131) (0.185) (0.127) (0.115) (0.181) 
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 3 years after  elections) 0.512** 0.570** -0.0135 0.116 0.175 
  (0.244) (0.267) (0.104) (0.102) (0.230) 
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 4 years after  elections) 0.263 3.807 0.26 0.748 3.564*** 
  (0.909) (3.122) (0.346) (1.092) (1.307) 
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Table 7 - Sources of revenue regressions 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Property Tax 
Waste 
Manag. 
Tax 
Other 
Taxes 
Other 
Fees 
Fees for 
Local 
Services 
       
State Alignment Dummy (=1 if local gov.  aligned 1.209 0.684 -1.182 -1.814 3.65 
with central gov.) (2.068) (2.564) (1.484) (1.901) (3.580) 
PC X State Alignment Dummy -0.184* 0.144 0.0371 -0.00918 0.327** 
  (0.102) (0.135) (0.0703) (0.0830) (0.153) 
Region Alignment Dummy (=1 if local gov.  aligned -3.933 1.605 -4.266* -0.647 -3.8 
 with regional  gov.) (3.874) (4.512) (2.503) (1.907) (4.607) 
PC X Region Alignment Dummy  -0.203 0.0889 -0.217 -0.0772 -0.303 
  (0.187) (0.253) (0.142) (0.0838) (0.241) 
Local gov coalition (1= center lft, 0= center right) -3.041 -3.275 4.648* -1.058 -2.582 
  (3.965) (5.096) (2.599) (2.707) (6.398) 
PC X Local gov coalition 0.0191 -0.304 0.0856 0.0513 0.519 
  (0.263) (0.364) (0.129) (0.114) (0.405) 
Incumbent Dummy( =1 reelected incumbent  -3.382 3.492 3.713* -3.26 -7.839 
second term) (3.704) (4.010) (2.160) (2.235) (5.080) 
PC X Incumbent Dummy 0.0305 0.101 0.185* -0.186** -0.264 
  (0.180) (0.207) (0.0944) (0.0919) (0.248) 
            
Observations 2,942 2,942 2,942 2,942 2,942 
            
Municipal Dummmies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Notes. Dependent variable: Various Items. PC is minus margin of victory calculated on previous mayoral 
elections.  
Clustered standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Control variables include: resident population, % of population below 15, % of population over 65, 
Income from real estate (real euro per capita), income from other sources (real euro per capita), % of 
resident taxpayers, regional and national current grants (real euro per-capita), local current expenditure 
(real euro per-capita lagged), deficit (real euro per-capita lagged).   
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	 Table 8 - Property Tax (IC
I), tax rate regressions, discounted (relevant for resident tax payers) and standard rates, PC
 
based on m
unicipal elections 
  
R
esiden
t R
edu
ced R
ates 
S
tan
dard R
ates 
  
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
PC
 (political com
petition
) 
-0.00537* 
-0.00526* 
-0.00523** 
-0.00484 
-0.00586 
-0.000893 
  
(0.00324) 
(0.00304) 
(0.00246) 
(0.00530) 
(0.00496) 
(0.00386) 
In
cu
m
ben
t D
u
m
m
y( =1 reelected  in
cu
m
ben
t secon
d term
) 
0.0103 
0.011 
0.0201 
-0.0465 
-0.0467 
-0.0127 
  
(0.0330) 
(0.0330) 
(0.0356) 
(0.0629) 
(0.0628) 
(0.0526) 
PC
 X
 In
cu
m
ben
t D
u
m
m
y 
0.000486 
0.000495 
0.000972 
-0.000501 
-0.00047 
0.00159 
  
(0.00110) 
(0.00110) 
(0.00113) 
(0.00195) 
(0.00198) 
(0.00196) 
Local gov coalition
 (1= cen
ter lft, 0= cen
ter righ
t) 
-0.134 
-0.134 
-0.0954 
-0.0314 
-0.0315 
0.00749 
  
(0.0959) 
(0.0953) 
(0.0696) 
(0.120) 
(0.120) 
(0.0940) 
PC
 X
 Local gov coalition
 
-0.00294 
-0.00293 
-0.00378 
-0.00104 
-0.000874 
-0.00264 
  
(0.00393) 
(0.00388) 
(0.00286) 
(0.00557) 
(0.00547) 
(0.00499) 
R
egion
 A
lign
m
en
t D
u
m
m
y (=1 if local gov. align
ed w
ith
 region
al  gov.) 
-0.0186 
-0.0179 
0.00969 
0.0207 
0.0181 
0.0448 
  
(0.0347) 
(0.0348) 
(0.0324) 
(0.0453) 
(0.0448) 
(0.0418) 
PC
 X
 R
egion
 A
lign
m
en
t D
u
m
m
y  
0.00047 
0.000538 
0.000564 
0.00292 
0.00259 
0.00458** 
  
(0.00185) 
(0.00186) 
(0.00195) 
(0.00211) 
(0.00204) 
(0.00218) 
E
lectoral C
ycle (election
 year ) 
 
 
0.0726*** 
 
 
0.0930*** 
  
 
 
(0.0231) 
 
 
(0.0356) 
E
lectoral C
ycle (1 year after  election
s) 
 
 
0.0627** 
 
 
0.110** 
  
 
 
(0.0273) 
 
 
(0.0500) 
E
lectoral C
ycle (2 years after  election
s) 
 
 
0.0272 
 
 
0.145*** 
  
 
 
(0.0261) 
 
 
(0.0458) 
E
lectoral C
ycle (3 years after  election
s) 
 
 
-0.0289 
 
 
0.104** 
  
 
 
(0.0290) 
 
 
(0.0442) 
E
lectoral C
ycle (4 years after  election
s) 
 
 
0.00226** 
 
 
-0.000176 
  
 
 
(0.000916) 
 
 
(0.00153) 
continue	on	next	page		
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Table 8 - Property Tax (IC
I), tax rate regressions, discounted (relevant for resident tax payers) and standard rates, PC
 
based on m
unicipal elections 
  
R
esiden
t R
edu
ced R
ates 
S
tan
dard R
ates 
  
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
PC
 X
 E
lectoral C
ycle (election
 year ) 
 
 
0.0015 
 
 
0.000147 
  
 
 
(0.00108) 
 
 
(0.00179) 
PC
 X
 E
lectoral C
ycle (1 year after election
s) 
 
 
7.81E
-05 
 
 
0.00267 
  
 
 
(0.00101) 
 
 
(0.00168) 
PC
 X
 E
lectoral C
ycle (2 years after election
s) 
 
 
-0.001 
 
 
0.00175 
  
 
 
(0.00101) 
 
 
(0.00187) 
PC
 X
 E
lectoral C
ycle ( 3 years after election
s) 
 
 
-0.0197 
 
 
-0.0509* 
  
 
 
(0.0220) 
 
 
(0.0284) 
PC
 X
 E
lectoral C
ycle ( 4 years after election
s) 
 
 
-0.00119* 
 
 
-0.00212* 
  
 
 
(0.000709) 
 
 
(0.00117) 
E
lectoral C
ycle (con
tin
u
u
s variable) 
 
0.0799*** 
  
 
0.123** 
 
  
 
(0.0303) 
  
 
(0.0482) 
 
E
lectoral C
ycle S
qu
ared 
 
0.00244* 
  
 
0.00299 
 
  
 
(0.00125) 
  
 
(0.00193) 
 
PC
 X
 E
lectoral C
ycle (con
tin
u
u
s variable) 
 
-0.0227*** 
  
 
-0.0250** 
 
  
 
(0.00835) 
  
 
(0.00989) 
 
PC
 X
 E
lectoral C
ycle S
qu
ared 
 
-0.000706** 
  
 
-0.000629 
 
  
		
(0.000317) 
  
		
(0.000438) 
		
O
bservation
s 
2,019 
2,019 
2,912 
2,019 
2,019 
2,912 
M
u
n
icipal D
u
m
m
m
ies 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Year D
u
m
m
ies 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
C
on
trol V
ariables 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
N
otes. C
lu
stered stan
dard errors in
 brackets, * sign
ifican
t at 10%
; ** sign
ifican
t at 5%
; *** sign
ifican
t at 1%
. C
on
trol variables in
clu
de: residen
t popu
lation
, %
 of 
popu
lation
 below
 15, %
 of popu
lation
 over 65, In
com
e from
 real estate (real eu
ro per capita), in
com
e from
 oth
er sou
rces (real eu
ro per capita), %
 of residen
t 
taxpayers, total cu
rren
t gran
ts (real eu
ro per-capita ), local cu
rren
t expen
ditu
re (real eu
ro per-capita lagged), deficit (real eu
ro per-capita lagged).   
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Table 9 – RDD results, coalition effect on tax ratio 
  		 		 		 		
RD Model Controls+FE 
Coefficient  
Observations 
estimates 
Local linear reg. 5.6% no 2.188 (2.0389) 1161 
Local linear reg. 11.2% no 0.7383 (1.3776) 1853 
1st poly. no -0.4234 (0.7396) 2286 
2nd poly. no 0.0937 (0.9891) 2286 
3rd poly. no 2.7891** (1.2128) 2286 
Local linear reg. 5.6% yes 2.1836 (2.1705) 976 
Local linear reg. 11.2% yes 0.5199 ( 1.5367 ) 1561 
1st poly. yes -0.3844 (1.1488) 1897 
2nd poly. yes 0.41 (1.6458) 1897 
3rd poly. yes 1.4946 (2.0517) 1897 
Notes. Clustered standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% Optimal bandwidth =0.05628 calculated using  rdbwselect and rdrobust commands in Stata 
following  Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Political classification of parties (1998-2008) 
 
Center-Left No. Center-Right No. Independents No. 
CEN-SIN(LS.CIVICHE) 2,565 CEN-DES(LS.CIVICHE) 1,245 LISTA CIVICA 265 
CEN-SIN 629 CEN-DES 403 IND 57 
DEMOCRATICI SINISTRA 246 FORZA ITALIA 251 SVP 20 
PDS 193 LEGA NORD 181 UV 7 
SINISTRA 140 CENTRO 127 PATTO SEGNI 6 
L'ULIVO 84 ALLEANZA NAZIONALE 87 DEMOCRAZIA EUROPEA 5 
P.POPOLARE ITALIANO 39 POLO PER LE LIBERTA' 30 MOV. PER L'AUTONOMIA 5 
PPI (POP) 27 CCD 26 RINNOV.IT-ALTRI 5 
DL.LA MARGHERITA 18 CASA DELLE LIBERTA' 17 SI 4 
RIF.COM. 17 CDU 14 LISTA LOCALE 1 
LA MARGHERITA 16 IL POPOLO DELLA LIBE 13 PRI 1 
PROGRESSISTI (1994) 8 LEGA LOMB-LEGA NORD 10   
CEN-SIN(CONTR.UFF.) 7 LG.NORD-LG.VENETA 10   
PARTITO DEMOCRATICO 7 L.VEN-L.NORD 9   
POPOLARI 6 LISTA CIVICA 9   
IND.SIN. 5 UDC 9   
PER VERONA 5 CCD-CDU 7   
PROGRESSISTI SALERNO 5 DESTRA 7   
SDI-ALTRI 5 FI-CCD 5   
FED.DEI VERDI 4 FI-CCD-AN 5   
UNITI NELL'ULIVO 4 POLO BUON GOVERNO 5   
ALL. DI PROGRESSO 3 CDL 4   
CENSIN 3 CENDES 4   
I DEMOCRATICI 3 LG.VENETA REPUBBLICA 4   
LA MARG. 2 U.D.EUR 3   
SDI 2 U.D.EUR POPOLARI 1   
SOCIALISTIALTRI 2 FI-CCD-CDU 1   
U.D.EUR 2 FORZA IT.-POLO POP. 1   
U.D.EUR POPOLARI 2 PDL 1   
P.DEM. 1     
PATTO DEMOCRATICI 1     
POPOLARI-CIVICA 1     
VERDI 1     
TOTAL 4,053  2,489  376 
 
Notes: Frequencies record the number of elected mayors in large municipalities classified as supported by each party. U.D.EUR and 
U.D.EUR POPOLARI are classified as a Center-Left party for the years 2006-2008 when they supported the center-left government. 
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Table A2 - Percentage of expenditure financed by fees (average values in the 
regression sample) 
 
Variables % of total expenditure 
% financed by fees 
mean median std. dev. 
General administration 31.09 2.23 1.73 3.19 
Environmental services 22.10 12.85 3.48 18.21 
Social services 11.97 11.00 6.56 12.72 
Education (complementary services) 10.01 13.43 12.35 9.94 
Public Roads and Transport* 7.84 6.15 0.54 11.29 
Local police 5.73 37.83 35.20 24.52 
Culture 4.03 3.88 0.71 6.82 
Nursery 3.53 12.41 11.10 11.75 
Sport 1.91 8.63 4.08 12.04 
Justice 0.92 0.31 0.00 2.54 
Tourism 0.88 2.91 0.00 11.62 
*Revenues from tickets are not included 
 
 
 
 
Table A3 – Taxes and Fees in Italian municipalities 
 
LOCAL TAXES LOCAL FEES LOCAL FEES for other services 
Property tax, Waste disposal, 
Municipal income tax, 
Electricity surcharge 
Sewerage and water, Revenue 
from municipal assets, Fines, 
School transport, Nursery and 
preschool, Burial fees, Elderly 
care, Road traffic and related 
services, Theatres and 
cultural activities, Municipal 
stadium and swimming pools, 
Libraries, museums and art 
galleries 
Municipal advertising tax, 
Occupation of public spaces 
and areas, Public billboards, 
Vital record certificates 
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Table A4. Tax Ratio Regressions on regional elections (all sample) 
		 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
		 	     
		 		 		 		 		 		
PC (political competition) -0.127***	 -0.127***	 -0.127***	 -0.0983*	 -0.112**	
		 (0.0210)	 (0.0217)	 (0.0216)	 (0.0508)	 (0.0493)	
State Alignment Dummy (=1 if local gov.  aligned  -0.131	 -0.0897	 -0.0530	 	
 with central gov.)  (0.303)	 (0.300)	 (0.624)	 	
PC X State Alignment Dummy    0.0143	 -0.00551	
		 	   (0.0263)	 (0.621)	
Incumbent Dummy( =1 reelected incumbent   0.348	 0.347	 -0.000453	 0.0171	
second term)  (0.375)	 (0.375)	 (0.810)	 (0.0261)	
PC X Incumbent Dummy    -0.00611	 0.0215	
		 	   (0.0371)	 (0.809)	
Local gov coalition (1= center lft, 0= center right)  0.597	 0.618	 -0.0469	 -0.00520	
   (0.639)	 (0.639)	 (1.111)	 (0.0373)	
PC X Local gov coalition    -0.00297	 -0.110	
		 	   (0.0472)	 (1.113)	
Region Alignment Dummy (=1 if local gov.  aligned  -0.105	 -0.108	 0.487	 -7.711***	
 with regional  gov.)  (0.412)	 (0.412)	 (0.843)	 (2.060)	
PC X Region Alignment Dummy     0.0180	 0.477	
		 	   (0.0385)	 (0.841)	
Electoral Cycle (election year )  0.731*	 	 -0.0781	 	
   (0.393)	 	 (0.703)	 	
Electoral Cycle ( 1 year after  elections)  0.412	 	 1.342*	 	
   (0.362)	 	 (0.755)	 	
Electoral Cycle ( 2 years after  elections)  0.0761	 	 0.940	 	
   (0.331)	 	 (0.686)	 	
Electoral Cycle ( 3 years after  elections)  -0.545	 	 -0.485	 	
   (0.363)	 	 (0.715)	 	
Electoral Cycle ( 4 years after  elections)  1.467**	 	 4.506***	 	
		 	 (0.709)	 	 (1.467)	 	
PC X Electoral Cycle (election year )    -0.0341	 	
		 	   (0.0292)	 	
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 1 year after  elections)    0.0178	 	
		 	   (0.0303)	 	
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 2 years after  elections)    0.0291	 	
		 	   (0.0289)	 	
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 3 years after  elections)    -0.00371	 	
		 	   (0.0274)	 	
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Table A4. Tax Ratio Regressions on regional elections (all sample) 
		 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
		 	     
		 		 		 		 		 		
   	 	 	
Electoral Cycle (continuus variable)   0.546*	 	 1.397**	
    (0.297)	 	 (0.589)	
Electoral Cycle Squared   -0.183**	 	 -0.359**	
    (0.0742)	 	 (0.143)	
PC X Electoral Cycle (continuus 
variable)     0.0229	
      (0.0258)	
PC X Electoral Cycle Squared     -0.00484	
		 	    (0.00650)	
		 		 		 		 		 		
Observations	 2,454	 2,454	 2,454	 1,670	 1,670	
		 	     
		 		 		 		 		 		
Municipal Dummmies Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Year Dummies Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Control Variables No	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	
	      
Notes. Dependent variable: Tax Ratio (%). PC is minus margin of victory calculated on previous regional 
Councils' elections. Clustered standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Control variables include: resident population, % of population below 15, % of 
population over 65, Income from real estate (real euro per capita), income from other sources (real euro 
per capita), % of resident taxpayers, regional and national current grants (real euro per-capita), local 
current expenditure (real euro per-capita lagged), deficit (real euro per-capita lagged). 
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Table A5. Current Expenditure  Regressions (all sample)    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
            
PC (political competition) 0.384 0.391 0.385 -0.351 -0.268 
  (0.367) (0.378) (0.377) (0.540) (0.520) 
State Alignment Dummy (=1 if local gov.  aligned  -6.648 -6.160 5.570 5.801 
 with central gov.)  (4.465) (4.397) (5.472) (5.373) 
PC X State Alignment Dummy    0.339 0.356 
     (0.342) (0.321) 
Incumbent Dummy( =1 reelected incumbent   3.543 3.531 -1.250 -1.269 
second term)  (6.335) (6.327) (6.681) (6.625) 
PC X Incumbent Dummy    -0.0162 -0.0167 
     (0.309) (0.305) 
Local gov coalition (1= center lft, 0= center right)  0.494 0.679 19.27* 18.92* 
   (8.301) (8.290) (10.42) (10.34) 
PC X Local gov coalition    0.787 0.766 
     (0.481) (0.479) 
Region Alignment Dummy (=1 if local gov.  aligned  -5.962 -5.965 -14.34** -14.90** 
 with regional  gov.)  (7.215) (7.213) (6.984) (6.953) 
PC X Region Alignment Dummy     -1.069*** -1.084*** 
     (0.348) (0.346) 
Electoral Cycle (election year )    11.32  
     (7.045)  
Electoral Cycle ( 1 year after  elections)    -3.595  
     (7.711)  
Electoral Cycle ( 2 years after  elections)    -2.600  
     (6.612)  
Electoral Cycle ( 3 years after  elections)    4.158  
     (8.162)  
Electoral Cycle ( 4 years after  elections)    21.85  
     (41.86)  
PC X Electoral Cycle (election year )    0.151  
     (0.298)  
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 1 year after  elections)    -0.127  
     (0.394)  
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 2 years after  elections)    -0.0758  
     (0.302)  
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 3 years after  elections)    0.139  
     (0.294)  
PC X Electoral Cycle ( 4 years after  elections)    5.205  
     (5.200)  
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continued	from	previous	page	
	
Table A5. Current Expenditure  Regressions (all sample)    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
            
      
Electoral Cycle (continuus variable)   2.907  -2.761 
    (4.284)  (5.570) 
Electoral Cycle Squared   -0.699  0.632 
    (1.040)  (1.323) 
PC X Electoral Cycle (continuus variable)     -0.133 
      (0.291) 
PC X Electoral Cycle Squared     0.0368 
      (0.0693) 
            
Observations 2,850 2,850 2,850 1,973 1,973 
            
Municipal Dummmies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables No No No Yes Yes 
      
Notes. Dependent variable: Municipalities Current Expenditures (per capita). PC is minus margin of 
victory calculated on previous mayoral elections. Clustered standard errors in brackets, * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Control variables include: resident population, % of 
population below 15, % of population over 65, Income from real estate (real euro per capita), income 
from other sources (real euro per capita), % of resident taxpayers, regional and national current grants 
(real euro per-capita), local current expenditure (real euro per-capita lagged), deficit (real euro per-capita 
lagged).   
 
	
	
	
Table A6 - Covariates no-discontinuity test (SUR model) 
   
Polynomial 
P-value 
 
Order  
1 0.0001  
2 0.2531  
3 0.1431  
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	 Table A
7 – IV
 analysis, tax ratio and property tax reduced rate 
  
D
epen
den
t variable 
  
Tax ratio 
Property Tax (IC
I), redu
ced 
tax rate 
Political com
petition
  
(m
u
n
icipal election
) 
  
2SLS 
2SLS 
(O
LS - FIR
ST STA
G
E
) 
  
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Political com
petition
 (m
u
n
icipal election
) 
-0.528** 
-0.408* 
-0.0147* 
-0.0142* 
  
  
(0.044) 
(0.072) 
(0.087) 
(0.099) 
  
  
Political com
petition
 (region
al election
) 
  
  
  
  
0.110*** 
0.113*** 
  
  
  
  
(0.007) 
(0.004) 
A
lign
m
en
t du
m
m
y, 1=local gov. align
ed w
ith
 cen
tral gov. 
  
-0.288 
  
-0.0188 
  
-0.387 
  
(0.387) 
  
(0.102) 
  
(0.251) 
In
cu
m
ben
t du
m
m
y, 1 = reelected in
cu
m
ben
t (secon
d term
) 
  
-0.725 
  
-0.0152 
  
-1.808*** 
  
(0.162) 
  
(0.491) 
  
(0.001) 
Local govern
m
en
t coalition
, 1=c.left, 0=c.righ
t 
  
0.525 
  
-0.02 
  
0.597 
  
(0.448) 
  
(0.466) 
  
(0.525) 
E
lectoral cycle, year from
 election
 
  
0.41 
  
0.0246* 
  
-0.684 
  
(0.273) 
  
(0.094) 
  
(0.114) 
E
lectoral cycle sq. 
  
-0.128 
  
-0.0062* 
  
0.172 
  
(0.171) 
  
(0.090) 
  
(0.125) 
O
th
er con
trol variables 
n
o 
yes 
n
o 
yes 
n
o 
yes 
M
u
n
icipal du
m
m
ies 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
Year du
m
m
ies 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
O
bservation
s 
1612 
1612 
1612 
1612 
1612 
1612 
U
n
deriden
tification
 test (K
leibergen
-Paap rk LM
 statistic) 
  
  
  
  
7.36 
8.42 
W
eak iden
tification
 test (K
leibergen
-Paap rk LM
 statistic) 
  
  
  
  
7.22 
8.49 
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	 N
otes. p-valu
es in
 brackets, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Th
e set of oth
er con
trol variables in
clu
de: residen
t popu
lation
, %
 of popu
lation
 below
 15, %
 of popu
lation
 over 
65, In
com
e from
 real estate (real eu
ro per capita), in
com
e from
 oth
er sou
rces (real eu
ro per capita), %
 of residen
t taxpayers, total cu
rren
t gran
ts (real eu
ro per-capita 
lagged), local cu
rren
t expen
ditu
re (real eu
ro per-capita lagged), deficit (real eu
ro per-capita lagged). 
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Figures 
Figure 1 – Electoral cycle (property tax, reduced tax rates) 
(a) 
 
Note. The graph reports on the vertical axes the sum of the estimated coefficients of  
PC and  Electoral Cycle + Electoral Cycle square and their interactions. (column 2, 
Table 8), the vertical lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
(b) 
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Note. The graph reports on the vertical axes the sum of the estimated coefficients of  
PC and Individual year Electoral Cycle dummies  and their interactions (column 3, 
Table 8), the vertical lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2. Tax ratio (RDD)  
(a) - all sample 
 
(b) – optimal bandwidth 
 
Notes. The central line split the polynomial functions in the margin of alignment fitted over the interval 
[-30, +30] in panel (a) and over the optimal bandwidth in panel (b), the lateral lines represent the 95% 
confidence interval. 
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Figure A1 – Density of the Assignment Variable (Margin of victory) 
